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Article 
 
Beyond Liability:  
Rewarding Effective Gatekeepers 
 
Lawrence A. Cunningham* 
 
 Corporate and securities law scholars increasingly investigate the role of rewards 
to promote desired behavior.1  Scholars have contributed considerable analysis to the 
utility of positive incentives for corporate whistleblowers;2 a growing body of literature 
addresses paying rewards to effective capital market gatekeepers, with attention given to 
outside directors3 and lawyers.4  Previous literature on gatekeepers concentrated on 
designing a liability system to achieve optimal deterrence while relying largely on 
gatekeeper reputation as a self-enforcement device.5  This Article reviews the previous 
literature, noting inherent limitations of reputation and liability threats, including how the 
latter discourage gatekeepers from performing desirable services such as fraud detection. 
It then begins to explore how a rewards program might be designed to overcome some of 
those limitations and improve gatekeeper effectiveness. 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School.  Thanks to John Coffee, Melvin 
Eisenberg, Claire Hill, Alan Palmiter and other participants in Columbia University Law School’s 
conference, “Gatekeepers Today: The Professions after the Reforms” (Sept. 29, 2006), where I presented 
an early version of this Article, and to Assaf Hamdani. 
 
1 See Tamar Frankel, Using the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to Reward Honest Corporations, 62 BUS. LAW. 161, 
171-73 & 189-91 (2006) (offering “honest corporations” exemptions from certain provisions of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
 
2 See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, “Carrots and Sticks:” Post-Enron Regulatory Initiatives, 8 BUFF. L. CRIM. L. 
REV. 277 (2004); Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model to Encourage Corporate 
Whistleblowers, 2006 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1107; Geoffrey Christopher Papps, Beyond Protection: Invigorating 
Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 BU L. REV. 91 (2007); 
David L. Schwarzkopf & Hugh M. Miller, Early Evidence of How Sarbanes-Oxley Implementation Affects 
Individuals and their Workplace Relationships, 110 BUS. &  SOC’Y REV. 21 (2005).  
 
3 See Assaf Hamdani & Reineir Kraakman, Rewarding Outside Directors, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1677, 1691-
93 & 1703-07 (2007) (proposing a hypothetical reverse negligence regime in which directors can sue to 
recover rewards following a triggering event, such as mis-reporting, by proving that they were non-
negligent in performing their duties or otherwise exceeded designated standards and also suggesting two 
more modest alternatives that reward directors who resign in certain circumstances and authorize board 
“leadership awards” to pay bonuses to outside directors for taking designated actions). 
 
4 See David McGowan, Why Not Try the Carrot? A Modest Proposal for Granting Immunity to Lawyers 
Who Disclose Client Financial Misconduct, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1825, 1837-38 & 1840 (2004) (offering 
transactional immunity to securities lawyers who first report violations of law to authorities). 
 
5 The seminal contributions to the theory of capital market gatekeeping are Reinier H. Kraakman, 
Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984) [hereinafter, 
Kraakman, Corporate Liability] and Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party 
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986) [hereinafter, Kraakman, Gatekeepers].  The ensuring 
discussion discusses additional contributions to this literature. 
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 The expanding interest in positive incentives for capital market gatekeepers 
dovetails with a broader and older trend in the regulation literature.  This reflects a 
philosophical shift away from traditional deterrence-oriented strategies toward more 
cooperative and rewards-oriented systems to promote compliance.6  This approach joins 
market and regulatory accountability mechanisms that are described using various terms 
such as cooperative compliance, interactive compliance, responsive regulation, 
collaborative governance and cooperative implementation.7  An important inspiration for 
this shift is empirical psychological evidence suggesting that positive incentives may be 
more likely to promote desired behavior than negative threats.8 
 
 This Article considers the context of financial reporting in connection with 
securities transactions.  Complex forces of social norms and legal culture shape the 
character of financial reports.  Forces operate at both the enterprise level and among third 
parties that enterprises enlist to assist in preparing disclosure, such as accountants and 
lawyers.  While law can influence financial reporting quality through negative threats or 
positive incentives, lawyers and legal scholars focus nearly entirely on negative threats, 
designing liability regimes to induce fair reporting.   Law imposes duties on enterprises, 
individuals, outside accounting and law firms and their individual professional 
employees.  The liability risks backing these regimes can be criminal or civil and include 
money damages, prison terms, fines, license revocations and the like.  Layers of liability 
analysis result.    
 
 Yet law never supplies positive inducements (even lighter sanctions for 
conscientious enterprises or gatekeepers are weaker sticks, not carrots).  True, traditional 
analysis also emphasizes reputation but mainly because gatekeepers put it at risk when 
attesting to the veracity of an enterprise’s assertions, meaning this likewise operates more 
as a stick than as a carrot.  One consequence of the existing regime’s emphasis on 
liability threats is to generate impressive professional resistance to undertaking a variety 
of potentially useful functions.  For example, the auditing profession has long resisted 
any undertaking to detect for fraud in financial audits and the legal profession has long 
resisted any undertaking to conduct due diligence exercises in preparing public offerings 
of securities.  
 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE 
DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992). 
 
7 E.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982); JAY A. SIGLER & JOSEPH E. MURPHY. 
INTERACTIVE CORPORATE COMPLIANCE (1988); see Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the 
Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487 (2003). 
 
8 See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION, supra note 6, at 49–50 (“[P]sychological theories 
of minimal sufficiency and positive attribution demonstrate that long-term internalization of a commitment 
to compliance is more likely to occur when triggered by positive incentives rather than punishment”); see 
generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW passum (1990). 
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 The prevailing regime’s overwhelming emphasis on sticks offers limited 
assurance of success.  That system failed during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Yet 
reforms concentrate on reconfiguring the type and combination of sticks in use.  For 
example, many emphasize the reduced threat of auditor liability during that period and 
respond by prescribing enhanced penalties.9  Others point to factors that reduce auditor 
investment in reputation, such as industry concentration,10 differences between partner 
incentives and firm-level incentives,11 and the proliferation of non-audit services.12   
 
 Law’s preoccupation with liability design is understandable since lawyers have a 
comparative advantage in liability design.  Designing reward systems may seem beyond 
law’s scope or lawyers’ competence.  A lawyer might expect that if rewards programs are 
productive, then market participants would design and implement them.  While this 
seems correct, two qualifications are relevant.  First, non-market impediments can 
frustrate implementing good ideas, as where gatekeepers fear that demonstrating the 
capability to perform a task will expose them to liability.  Second, contemporary financial 
reporting occurs in a complex setting that combines free market innovation with 
considerable regulatory limitations.  The combination may prevent otherwise appealing 
contractual innovations from gaining traction.  If so, lawyers—and legal scholars—may 
have capacity to spark ideas that markets can test and implement.  It is in that spirit that 
this Article introduces the possibility of going beyond liability to design rewards for 
effective gatekeepers.  
 
 Part I reviews the theory of capital market gatekeeping.  It presents the conceptual 
underpinnings of the model and how a combination of reputation and liability risks 
sustains it.   Part II analyzes recent experience that shows limitations on the theory in 
practice, including limitations that continue despite various reforms.  From this fairly 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE ROLE OF THE PROFESSIONS IN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 14–21 (2006); William W. Bratton, Jr., Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 
TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1350 (2002); William W. Bratton, Jr., Shareholder Value and Auditor Independence, 53 
DUKE L.J. 439, 470 (2003); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, 
Stupid”, 57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1403–05, 1409–10 (2002). 
  
10 See, e.g., U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Pub. No. GAO-03-864, Public Accounting Firms: Mandated 
Study on Consolidation and Competition 16, 20–22 (2003), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03864.pdf; 
Sean M. O’Connor, Be Careful What you Wish For: How Accountants and Congress Created the Problem 
of Auditor Independence, 45 B.C. L. REV 741, 787–88 (2004); Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a 
Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 775, 786 (2006).  See infra text accompanying notes 113–116. 
 
11 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron, 89 CORNELL 
L. REV. 394, 407–08 (2004); Richard W. Painter, Convergence and Competition in Rules Governing 
Lawyers and Auditors, 29 IOWA J. CORP. L. 397, 412 (2004); Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability of 
Professional Firms After Enron, 29 IOWA J. CORP. L. 427, 447 (2004); see also Jonathan Macey & Hillary 
A. Sale, Observations on the Role of Commodification, Independence, and Governance in the Accounting 
Industry, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1167, 1173 (2003).  See infra text accompanying notes 95–100. 
 
12 See e.g., Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, supra note 9; Macey, Efficient Capital 
Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron, supra note 9; Prentice, Inevitability of a Strong SEC, supra 
note 10.  See infra text accompanying notes 102–112. 
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extensive review offered to provide context, a rewards program emerges as a way to meet 
some of these limitations.  The analysis in each of these Parts highlights how the 
prevailing approach has the perverse effect of discouraging gatekeepers from performing 
vital functions.    
  
 Part III explores ways to design positive incentives to promote effective capital 
market gatekeeping.  It draws on the intuition behind the evidence suggesting that 
positive incentives can be more effective than negative threats in promoting desired 
behavior.  Positive incentives can induce gatekeepers to perform vital functions that the 
current regime discourages them from performing.  While the Article cannot provide all 
the details of a comprehensive incentive program applicable for all gatekeepers in all 
circumstances, it contributes a general framework, model and illustrations to contribute to 
the emerging literature taking the rewards approach.  
 
I. THEORY 
 
 This Part reviews the well-known theory of capital market gatekeeping. Section A 
summarizes the standard model, distinguishing gatekeepers from whistleblowers and 
from various hybrid roles that professionals can assume.  Section B focuses on the 
conditions necessary for effective gatekeeping (reputation and liability risk).  Section C 
discusses costs of the standard model.  The review entices inquiry into how adding 
explicit positive incentives can promote more effective gatekeeping. 
 
A. Conceptions  
 
 Several varieties of third-party assistance in accessing capital markets exist.  The 
following considers the attributes and distinctions among those usually described as 
“gatekeepers” and “whistleblowers” and then considers some that partake of attributes of 
each (called hybrids below).  
 
 1. Gatekeepers — Gatekeepers work with an enterprise to correct mis-reporting 
before it occurs.13  They do so by threatening to withhold support necessary to complete a 
report or consummate a transaction. Gatekeepers can deny access to capital markets.14  
So gatekeepers are “intermediaries who provide verification and certification services to 
                                                 
13 See Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L. 
REV. 869, 883 (1990) (“A well-functioning gatekeeper regime is an elegant enforcement strategy. 
Wrongdoing is prevented, rather than punished after the fact, without the substantial administrative costs of 
a formal enforcement proceeding.”).  
 
14 See Peter C. Kostant, Breeding Better Watchdogs: Multidisciplinary Partnerships in Corporate Legal 
Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1213, 1247 (2000). 
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investors” by pledging their professional reputations15—and, by withholding such 
support, block admission through the gate.16  
 
 Law’s gatekeeper approach always imposes a monitoring duty but not necessarily 
a reporting duty: eventual discovery exposes the gatekeeper to liability for the primary 
violation, not merely a remedy for non-reporting.  Even so, the gatekeeper approach is 
intended to give professionals regulatory incentives to prevent mis-reporting.17 Most 
gatekeepers are paid for their services by the enterprises that retain them; all have stated 
duties whose breach exposes them to legal liability.  
 
 Gatekeepers include auditors and attorneys, who work directly with and 
essentially inside the enterprise.  Auditors attest to financial statement assertions under 
duties established by statute and articulated in professional codes of performance.18   
Lawyers advise on transaction design and disclosure.  Lawyers often determine whether 
senior executives can sign disclosure documents and also provide written legal opinions 
or memoranda concerning the legality of transactions and their compliance with law. 
Duties of both auditors and lawyers arise initially from contract but include a regulatory 
overlay of professional standards. 
 
 Gatekeepers also include other transaction participants, such as investment banks 
and sometimes rating agencies, plus professionals working apart from transactions or 
outside the enterprise, such as securities analysts, and possibly stock exchanges and 
mutual funds.19  Unlike auditors and lawyers, these gatekeepers do not typically act under 
any legal duty or vouch for statements that the enterprise makes about itself.   Instead 
                                                 
15 John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 269, 279–280 (2004). 
 
16 This reconciles what otherwise appear to be two distinct definitional conceptions of gatekeepers that 
appear in the literature. See Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of 
Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 393, n. 219 (2006) (identifying two strands of definition as those 
who: (a) certify as reputational intermediaries or (b) restrict access and endorse those admitted with their 
reputation for discretion); Peter Oh, Gatekeeping, 29 IOWA J. CORP. L. 735, 737 (2004) (noting conflation 
of reputational intermediary and professional capable of disrupting entry and exploring the distinction). 
 
17 Editors, Developments in the Law: Corporations and Society, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2227, 2245 (2004). 
 
18 See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j-1 (statute stating audit requirements for 
detecting illegal acts); AICPA, Statement of Auditing Standards No. 54 (professional standards stating such 
requirements, later adopted by the PCAOB); SEC, Auditor Independence Requirements (Nov. 21, 2000) 
(regulations stating independence requirements); Statement of Auditing Standards No. 95 (professional 
statement of generally accepted auditing standards, later adopted by the PCAOB); Statement of Auditing 
Standards No. 99 (professional standards as to consideration of fraud in a financial statement audit, later 
adopted by the PCAOB).  As to standards originally established by the AICPA adopted by the PCOAB, see 
SEC Order (April 25, 2003) (endorsing PCAOB adoption as interim standards those previously adopted by 
the AICPA). 
 
19 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The Financial Statement Insurance Alternative to 
Auditor Liability, 52 UCLA L. REV. 413, 417–18 n. 6 (2004) 
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they provide their own statements, such as a securities rating or a buy-sell 
recommendation. 
 
 Professionals within this broad conception of gatekeepers thus differ 
significantly.20  Roles vary with product or service type and the information its buyers 
and users receive.  Also varying are what professionals attest to or certify, such as 
fairness of financial statement assertions, legality of a securities issuance, quality of a 
debt instrument and so on.21  
 
 Accordingly, also varying are all other public policy aspects of their respective 
performance, including requirements, expectations, capacities, incentives and appropriate 
legal liability for failure.22  Indeed, auditors and attorneys reside at opposite ends of a 
gatekeeping spectrum: both put reputations and liability on the line but lawyers take 
leading roles in deal design and disclosure preparation while auditors take back-up roles 
in reviewing and testing disclosure.23  Despite these differences, the term gatekeeper has 
assumed customary usage, not only in the academic literature but in official regulatory 
pronouncements.24  
 
 2.  Whistleblowers — Whistleblowers differ conceptually from gatekeepers. 
While gatekeepers generally work with enterprises to negotiate access to capital markets 
or deny it without further ado (keeping information confidential), whistleblowers report 
violations to the public or to authorities.25  When gatekeepers determine that they cannot 
exercise internal influence to correct statements that require correcting, they may resign 
or otherwise withhold their services. However, this does not involve blowing a whistle to 
any enforcement authority or the public.26  The distinctive feature of the whistleblower, 
then, is that the third party discloses wrongdoing to authorities or third parties.27 
                                                 
20 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 
84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 306 & 346–64 (stating that “all gatekeepers are not alike,” and developing proposals 
with entirely different content for auditors and for securities lawyers). 
 
21 See also Arthur B. Laby, Differentiating Gatekeepers, 1 BROOKLYN J. CORP., FIN. & COMM. L. 119, 124-
34 (distinguishing between independent and dependent gatekeepers) (2006). 
 
22 See Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers, supra note 19, at n. 6. 
 
23 Coffee, What Caused Enron, supra note 15, at 279–80. 
 
24 See Coffee, What Caused Enron, supra note 15, at n. 35 (citing, for example, Revision of the 
Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7870, 65 Fed. Reg. 
43,148, 43,150 (July 12, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 240) (“the federal securities laws . . . make 
independent auditors ‘gatekeepers’ to the public securities markets”)).  
 
25 See generally STEPHEN M. KOHN, ET AL., WHISTLEBLOWER LAW: A GUIDE TO LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR 
CORPORATE EMPLOYEES (2004). 
 
26 See Howell E. Jackson, Reflections on Kaye Scholer: Enlisting Lawyers to Improve the Regulation of 
Financial Institutions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1028 n. 30 (1993) (“While disaffirmance or resignation 
may have informational content in some cases, it is distinct from a pure whistleblowing obligation.”). 
 
27 See Developments in the Law, supra note 17, at 2245. 
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 There are three recognized forms of whistleblowers. The first is the volunteer 
whose interest in whistle-blowing is not based on any duty and does not lead to any 
reward.28 The classic example is the enterprise employee who comes forward with 
evidence of wrongdoing. This employee is protected under various statutes against 
retaliation and is entitled to compensatory damages arising from costs of pursuing this 
redress.  Notably, for employees, whistle-blowing doctrines usually provide job security, 
resisting the enterprise’s temptations toward retaliatory discharge.29 
 
 The second is the volunteer who shares in a bounty arising from blowing the 
whistle.  Outside the securities context, the classic example is the qui tam action.30  The 
most prominent illustrations are cases under the False Claims Act.31  Private parties are 
vested with authority to prosecute claims of violations of laws and share in the recovery 
on behalf of government.  Analogous bounty schemes appear, including, in the securities 
law context, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s insider trading bounty program32 
and, in the tax context, the Internal Revenue Service’s informant rewards system.33 
 
 The third form of whistleblower is the non-volunteer, one with duties to come 
forward and publicly disclose discovered wrongdoing.  This type of whistleblower is also 
primarily a gatekeeper but has specific additional whistle blowing duties. Consider, for 
example, auditors. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA)34 expanded 
auditor whistle-blowing obligations, requiring the reporting of illegal acts within an 
enterprise and to the SEC if satisfactory responses are not forthcoming from within the 
enterprise.35  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
28 See Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model To Encourage Corporate Whistleblowers, 
2006 BYU L. REV. 1108, 1126–31 (discussing the standard “anti-retaliation” model in general and its 
weaknesses in the particular context of capital market context).. 
 
29 See Papps, supra note 2, at 112-17 & 119-20. 
 
30 See generally Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2002); Richard A. Bales, A 
Constitutional Defense of Qui Tam, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 381; Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, 
and the Role of the Plaintiff, 1997 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 167. 
 
31 18 U.S.C. § 287 (2006). 
 
32 17 C.F.R. 201 (2006); see also Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u-1. 
 
33 See Internal Revenue Service, Pub. No. 733, Rewards for Information Provided by Individuals to the 
Internal Revenue Service (1997). For analysis of these and several other federal bounty programs, see 
Marsha J. Ferziger & Daniel G. Currell, Snitching for Dollars: The Economics and Public Policy of 
Federal Civil Bounty Programs, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1141. 
 
34 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, 758 codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4. 
 
35 See Kostant, Breeding Better Watchdogs, supra note 14, at 1246, n. 150.  Notably, few reports have been 
made under this provision.  See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Securities Exchange Act: Review of 
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 3. Hybrids —  Despite conceptual distinctions, the categories of gatekeeper and 
whistleblower can sometimes overlap and give rise to hybrids.   For example, auditors 
can perform roles that partake of both a gatekeeper and a whistleblower function.   
Suppose an auditor determines that a client is committing illegal acts and the client 
refuses to redress the violations.  It must both resign from the engagement and disclose 
the illegal acts.36  That exercises both the gatekeeping function by refusing support and 
the whistle-blowing by reporting to the authorities.  Lawyers may be seen either as 
gatekeepers or whistleblowers in circumstances when their duty of client confidentiality 
comes into tension with their duty to avoid assisting in criminal or fraudulent activity.37   
 
 The SEC’s struggle to formulate rules governing lawyer professionalism reveals 
the difficulty of classifying attorneys as either gatekeepers or whistleblowers.38 As 
adopted, SEC rules permit but do not require disclosing confidential information to 
prevent crime or fraud.39 That does not quite fit the typical whistleblower classification, 
the essence of which is reporting.40 The SEC proposed, but did not adopt, the so-called 
“noisy withdrawal” alternative, which contemplates a lawyer announcing publicly its 
resignation based on perceived client violations.41  This appears closer to the typical 
                                                                                                                                                 
Reporting Under Section 10A, at 2 (2003), available at http:// www.gao.gov/new.items/d03982r.pdf.; John 
C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1306 n. 39 
(2003) (citing SEC reports). Professor Coffee attributes this either to few actual problems or rationalized 
self-interest. Another likely possibility is the chaperon thesis, in which auditors observing problems get 
them corrected so the client can be admitted, not bounced. That is, they perform their gatekeeping function 
first.  
 
36 Sec. & Exch. Comm., Reg. S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.304 (Item 304); Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 
10A(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. 78h-1 (2007) (illegal acts); see Darin Bartholomew, Is Silence Golden When It Comes 
to Auditing, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 57, 93–102 (2002); Kostant, Breeding Better Watchdogs, supra note 
14, at 1245–46. 
 
37 See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 553, 562–563 (1989) (construing and applying “crime-fraud 
exception to the attorney-client privilege”); Tamar R. Brickhead, The Conviction of Lynne Stewart and the 
Uncertain Future of the Right to Defend, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 5-10 (2006) (critical discussion of 
criminal conviction of criminal defense lawyer concerning activities arising out of the attorney-client 
relationship); Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 67 (2000); Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct 
R. 1.6(b) (2004); Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.13(c)); see also Richard W. Painter & Jennifer E. 
Duggan, Lawyer Disclosure of Corporate Fraud: Establishing a Firm Foundation, 50 SMU L. REV. 225 
(1996) (exploring imposition of affirmative duties on auditors respecting steps to take when confronting 
corporate and exploring how one would adapt analogous provisions for the legal profession). 
 
38 See Roger C. Cramton, George M. Cohen & Susan P. Koniak, Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After 
Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV. 725, 779–810 (2004) (extensive discussion and analysis of the “reporting 
out” concept). 
 
39 See 17 C.F.R. 205.3(d)(2) (2003), http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8185.htm  
 
40 Developments in the Law, supra note 17, at 2245–46.  
 
41 Cramton, Cohen & Koniak, supra note 38, at 810–813 (recapitulation of analysis of the proposed “noisy 
withdrawal” concept). 
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whistle-blowing class,42 but is not quite whistle-blowing due to limitations arising from 
the attorney-client privilege.43  
 
 Nor do SEC rules as adopted embrace the gatekeeping model. Under the rules, 
lawyers must report violations to designated internal officials within the enterprise (called 
“up-the-ladder reporting”) without necessarily reporting to outside authorities.44 But other 
elements of the gatekeeping model are missing: up-the-ladder reporting does not include 
the standard gatekeeping remedy of denying a client capital market access by withholding 
transactional support.45  So lawyers no doubt play a role in superintending capital market 
integrity, although it is not exactly clear whether they are gatekeepers or whistle-blowers 
or something more of a hybrid. 
 
 B. Conditions 
 
 Law’s whistle-blowing model is simpler than its gatekeeping model. The former 
relies upon either payment or protection without venturing into the terms of the 
relationship between the actor and the wrongdoer.  The gatekeeping model must not only 
design a relationship and specify duties, it must attend to the roles that reputation and 
liability play in its operation. Consequently, numerous conditions must obtain for a 
gatekeeping model to succeed. 
 
 As a threshold matter, and in keeping with the metaphor, there must be a gate to 
keep.  It must be one that an enterprise has to traverse to access capital markets and there 
can be no other way through it—at least some gatekeeper must tend the gate.  Likewise, 
the gate cannot be opened absent a keeper’s volition.  The metaphor attempts to capture 
initial offerings of securities as well as secondary market transactions and periodic 
reporting exercises.  
 
                                                 
42 Developments in the Law, supra note 17, at 2246. 
 
43 M. Peter Moser & Stanley Keller, Sarbanes-Oxley 307: Trusted Counselors or Informers?, 49 VILL. L. 
REV. 833, 848–849 (2004) (summarizing grounds for objecting to the noisy withdrawal concept reflecting 
tensions with traditional values embedded in the attorney-client relationship). 
 
44 17 C.F.R. 205.3(d)(2) (2003), http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8185.htm. 
  
45 See Coffee, The Attorney as Gatekeeper, supra note 35, at 1301–1302 (distinguishing up-the-ladder 
reporting required from “other, potentially more extensive gatekeeping duties”).  On these and other 
aspects of the SEC rulemaking in this context, see Stephen M. Bainbridge & Christina J. Johnson, 
Managerialism, Legal Ethics, and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 299, [pin cite] 
(Section 307 and the Part 205 Rules give lawyers many ways to avoid reporting, so incentives have not 
changed much); Peter C. Kostant, Sarbanes-Oxley and Changing the Norms of Corporate Lawyering, 2004 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 541, 550-58(Section 307 and the Part 205 Rules have flaws but bode well to improve 
normative self-conception of securities lawyers to assume gatekeeper function); Lisa H. Nicholson, SarbOx 
307’s Impact on Subordinate In-House Counsel: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 2004 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 559, 603-13 (failure to distinguish and give special dispensation to low level in-house counsel is 
defect in Part 205 Rules). 
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 More fundamentally, the keeper must be able to influence the petitioner, to groom 
it for admission. For example, the third party must be able to promote fair reporting.  
That implies a universe of participants connected to initial, periodic or transactional 
reporting exercises. Federal securities laws have long imposed duties and associated 
liability risks on such persons and private and SEC enforcement actions make the risk 
real.46 This approach can be justified by how these third parties enjoy low-cost access to 
information and can provide a “private monitoring service on behalf of the capital 
markets.”47 
 
 Gatekeepers must be independent and possess sufficient stakes in their reputations 
as keepers so that petitioner bribes cannot weaken their resolve. Legal theorists 
emphasize that keepers can be effective when many petitioners seek entrance so that no 
admission fee (or bribe) can outweigh the expected costs of admitting the inadmissible.48  
As Professor Coffee says, “At least in theory, a gatekeeper would not rationally sacrifice 
this reputational capital for a single client who accounts for only a small portion of its 
revenues.”49 
 
 So the third party must be an “outsider” in the sense that it commands assets apart 
from the enterprise and its individual members pursue careers apart from the enterprise.50 
This creates an incentive structure that differs from the enterprise and its employees.51  
As Professor Kraakman explained in his pioneering analysis, third parties usually “are 
likely to have less to gain and more to lose from [misleading reporting] than inside 
managers.”52 The stakes for these gatekeepers are influenced by both reputation and 
liability concerns, and their components can operate at the levels of individual actors, 
their firms and entire professions.  Each influence is considered in turn. 
 
 1. Reputation — Enterprises accessing capital markets can use two reputations to 
signal reliability: their own reputations for candor and that of their gatekeepers for 
thoroughness and veracity.  Enterprises seeking access, initially or as an ongoing matter, 
                                                 
46 Section 11 of the 1933 act and Section 10 of the 1934 Act impose these duties and risks. Securities Act of 
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77(q)(a) 
(imposing on auditors the duties of inquiry and disclosure); 15 U.S.C. § 78r (creating private rights of 
action against persons, including accountants, who “make or cause to be made” materially misleading 
statements in reports or other documents filed with the SEC). 
 
47 See Kraakman, Corporate Liability, supra note 5, at 891.   
 
48 See Poonam Puri, Taking Stock of Taking Stock, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 99, 146 (2001). 
 
49 Coffee, The Attorney as Gatekeeper, supra note 35, at 1269. 
 
50 Kraakman, Corporate Liability, supra note 5, at 891. 
 
51  Professor Kraakman’s chief insight is that “whenever potential offenders must employ incorruptible 
outsiders to gain legitimacy or expertise or to met [sic] a legal requirement, gatekeeper liability will thwart 
a class of offenses that are unreachable through enterprise-level or managerial sanctions.” Id.  
 
52 Id. 
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develop or have their own reputations for the quality of their disclosure, on the range 
from fair to misleading reporting.  Candid enterprises enjoy more investor trust.53  The 
more valuable a reputation is, the greater is the cost of jeopardizing it through 
opportunistic abuse of that trust.54  
  
 Enterprises can hire third-parties to achieve similar purposes.  The enterprise can 
hire attorneys, auditors, underwriters, and rating agencies to provide reports backed by 
their respective reputations for thoroughness and veracity. Thorough and honest 
gatekeepers enjoy more credibility, a valuable trait.  The more valuable it is, the greater is 
the risk of reputation loss so that, at some point, no additional incentives are necessary.55  
 
 The more frequently firms are employed to serve as gatekeepers, and the larger 
the number of repeat occasions in which they expect to play these roles, the greater the 
value.56  Enterprises pay fees for this credence.  Investors and other market participants 
appreciate these as valuable signals.57  When operating effectively, they contribute to a 
market in which securities prices tend to converge accurately toward the fundamental 
value of the related enterprise.58  
  
  Most gatekeepers are part of a profession that boasts its own reputation. An 
individual’s or firm’s membership in a profession creates an externality—each member 
of the profession exploits the profession’s reputation.59 An individual’s or firm’s 
investment in reputation should generate not only private benefits for them, but also 
wider benefits for the profession.  If so, firms and individuals can free ride on the 
investments of others.  That can have the effect of reducing incentives to invest.  The 
effect is dramatized by the presence of so-called bucket shops, securities firms engaged in 
                                                 
53 Joseph A. Franco, Why Antifraud Prohibitions are not Enough: The Significance of Opportunism, 
Candor and Signaling in the Economic Case for Mandatory Securities Disclosure, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 223, 308–11. 
 
54 See id.  
 
55 See Victor P. Goldberg, Accountable Accountants: Is Third-Party Liability Necessary?, 17 J. LEG. STUD. 
295, 312 (1988) (reputations of auditors sufficient so third-party liability not necessary). 
 
56 See David Charney, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 375, 408–25 
(1990).  
 
57 Coffee, What Caused Enron, supra note 15, at 279–80 (2004) (“[The] market recognizes that the 
gatekeeper has less incentive to deceive than does its client and thus regards the gatekeeper’s assurance or 
evaluation as more credible than the client’s statements.”). 
 
58 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 
549, 618–21 (1984) (investment bankers’ good reputations promote efficient markets). 
 
59 Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. 
REV. 781, 787–88 (2001) [hereinafter Black, Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets].  
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small-scale deception while benefiting from the securities profession’s broader 
reputation.  The problem can creep into the practices of law and public accounting.60  
 
 Professions address these externality and free rider problems using various 
strategies.  First, professional membership associations articulate professional codes of 
gatekeeper ethics or conduct. These codes effectively admonish that admitting the 
inadmissible is simply wrong. Indeed, to some extent, the professional identifies of 
lawyers and accountants are based upon such codes.61 
 
 Second, such associations may provide or promote licensing or disciplining 
schemes that implicitly vouch for each gatekeeper.62  Examples are the programs 
overseen by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)63 for 
auditors and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)64 for securities firms, 
including underwriters.  Professional associations can police reputations of members and 
deny admission to unqualified applicants or expel non-compliant members.  Resulting 
threats may improve a profession’s return on investment in reputation by individuals and 
firms.  
 
 While profession-driven reputation protection can be critical, the professions have 
not proven particularly good at providing it.65  This mixed success could be due, in part, 
to how the professions’ toolboxes contain sticks and not carrots. True, licenses are carrots 
when first issued, as a badge of professional honor.66   But the threat of revocation is 
more nearly a stick.  Enforcement leads to suspensions or expulsions. 
 
 Even so, professional aspirations suggest the importance of culture and norms in 
any analysis of reputation as a constraint on gatekeeper performance. This entails an 
enormously complex set of factors that it is difficult to untangle and exceedingly difficult 
for law to micro-manage.67  Law can tinker with procedures and policies but these must 
                                                 
60 See id. 
 
61 See Pamela S. Karlan, Contingent Fees and Criminal Cases, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 595, 629-32 (1993) 
(lawyers as gatekeepers in respect to contingent fees in criminal cases); David B. Wilkins, Who Should 
Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 801, 811 (1992) (noting that ABA ethics code “constitute[s] the 
most influential source[] of professional norms”). 
 
62 Black, Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, supra note 59, at 788–89.  
 
63 See www.aicpa.org.  
 
64 See www.nasd.org.  
 
65 See Prentice, Inevitability of a Strong SEC,  supra note 10, at 788-89 & 795-97 (as to NASD and New 
York Stock Exchange). 
 
66 Black, Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, supra note 59, at 788–89.  
 
67 An abundant literature written in recent decades explores the relationship of norms to law, how norms are 
formed, and their role in influencing compliance with law.  See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER 
WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Understanding Norms, 
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be tailored to the peculiar attributes of a profession and in tune with idiosyncrasies of 
given firms and individuals.68 
 
 To highlight some of these complexities, there is debate about exactly what kind 
of reputation various gatekeepers seek to maintain.69  For auditors, it commonly is said 
that their reputation for honesty is their most valuable asset.70  But as a matter of practice 
for effective auditing, more important is a reputation with management for toughness.71  
For lawyers, there is disagreement as to whether they seek to develop reputations with 
managers for complicity and empathy or with external investors for performing any kind 
of gatekeeping function.72  
 
 2. Liability — An extensive literature dissects the components and effectiveness 
of first-party versus third-party liability enforcement strategies. First-party liability 
punishes the primary wrongdoer, and legal theory predicts a deterrent effect ex ante and a 
cost-internalization ex post.73  Third-party liability supplements this device to address 
residual risks that the former fails to deter or so internalize.74  It works when a third party 
is able to deter or coerce cost-internalization.  Law exploits this ability by imposing 
liability threats on gatekeepers based on primary violations of their clients. 
 
 Securities professionals have duties: approving transactions, designing or opining 
on them or related disclosure, and providing assurance and attestation of financial 
statement assertions.  Failure in these duties triggers liability under various state and 
federal claims, a panoply of SEC administrative sanctions, and criminal law.75  In 
significant part, these doctrines are based on a theory of deterrence, a negative injunction 
                                                                                                                                                 
49 U. TORONTO L.J. 177 (1999); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000); see also sources cited 
infra note 235. 
 
68 See Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry Into Lawyers’ Responsibility 
for Clients’ Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 115 (1993) [hereinafter Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers?]. 
 
69 See McGowan, Why Not Try the Carrot?, supra note 4, at 1828. 
 
70 E.g., DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.) (“An accountant’s 
greatest asset is its reputation for honesty, followed closely by its reputation for careful work”), cert. denied 
498 U.S. 941 (1990). 
 
71 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Too Big to Fail: Moral Hazard in Auditing and the Need to Restructure 
the Industry before it Unravels, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1698, 1726–27 (2006). 
 
72 See Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers?, supra note  68, at 101–11; McGowan, Why Not Try the 
Carrot?, supra note 4, at 1833–34. 
 
73 See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate 
Liability Regimes, 72 NYU L. Rev. 687,701-05 (1997). 
 
74 Kraakman, Corporate Liability, supra note 5, at 701-05. 
 
75 See Puri, supra note 48, at 148–49 (reviewing all these liability risks). 
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to discourage misbehavior.76 Scholars endlessly debate and policy analysts endlessly 
tinker with the numerous intricacies of this framework to seek its optimal structure.77 The 
following briefly highlights several examples. 
 
 Some believe that the liability risk need not be as great as is traditional in the 
United States—a few high-damage lawsuits a decade are enough.78 Others believe that 
even less liability risk is necessary for lawyers, because they are naturally cautious by 
training, represent clients with liability risk on the line, and protect their reputations by 
keeping their clients out of losing securities lawsuits.79 Yet others cite the benefits of 
increasing liability with a hint of incontestability. Thus, “[r]aising the penalties for both 
primary and third parties can be an effective way to make gatekeeping regimes work.”80 
Professor Coffee states: “The more we suspect that attorneys will avert their gaze, the 
more we need to raise the penalties to deter them from so doing.”81   
 
 The shape of liability exposure can be altered, as by expanding the scope of duties 
or of doctrines such as broad interpretations of concepts like “substantial assistance” used 
to impose liability.82  Or due diligence duties could be specified expansively. Third-party 
liability can be strict (as under the doctrine of respondeat superior) or duty-based (as 
under the doctrines of aiding-and-abetting or negligent non-detection).83  
 
                                                 
76 See Michael A. Perino, Enron’s Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the Deterrence Aspects of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 671, 676 (2002). See generally Gary S. Becker, 
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, in ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT 1 (GARY S. BECKER & WILLIAM M. LANDES EDS., 1974). 
 
77 See, e.g., Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and the Firm, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 451, 497-523 
(2003) (conceiving regulatory compliance as another routine for an organization pursued the way other 
routines are, to supplement typical profit-maximizing and law-abiding images for a realistic appraisal); 
Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in Preventing Corporate 
Crime, 55 FLA. L. REV. 937, 956–73 (2003) (showing limitations of rational choice and unconscious 
instinct models of obedience, the former due to biased judgment risk impairing calculability and the latter 
offset by competing social forces at sub-group levels such as corporate culture and observing that 
additional incentives are supplied by private and regulatory enforcement). 
 
78 Black, Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, supra note 59, at 794 (accountants) & 795 (bankers). 
 
79 Id. at 795 & 800. 
 
80 Kostant, Breeding Better Watchdogs, supra note 14, at 1248, n. 159.  
 
81 Coffee, The Attorney as Gatekeeper, supra note 35, at 1306.  
 
82 Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers?, supra note 68, at 115. 
 
83 Compare Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 491, 540-46 (2001) 
(exploring strict liability for auditors)  with John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform, supra note 
20, at 354 (evaluating relative strict liability for auditors such as a limitation on liability based on an 
affirmative defense requiring proof of non-negligence and good faith). 
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 Some believe in the possibility of calibrating the duty to the penalties in optimal 
ways, as by a sliding scale on which, as liability standards move from negligence to strict 
liability, associated punishment for violations can be relaxed accordingly.84 Others 
contend that an optimal regime would allow gatekeepers to negotiate contracts with 
clients stating the levels of review and assurance to be provided, along with express terms 
of liability exposure tailored to that performance.85 
 
 Scholars debate the method and effectiveness of alternatives means of 
enforcement. They debate the scope of private rights of action under Section 10b or argue 
that stepped up public (SEC) enforcement is superior.86  In this quest, also relevant is the 
relative ability of enforcement authorities to learn of violations that warrant enforcement 
activity.87  Damages caps and safe harbors are likewise debated, along with the role of 
insurance.88 To conclude this non-exhaustive highlight of the many contestable 
parameters of system design, scholars debate the merits of enterprise versus individual 
liability.89 
 
 Finally, some believe that the corollary of liability regulation works too.  Consider 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines addressing corporate criminality.  While increasing 
sanctions on the guilty, they also reduce sanctions for those who actively seek to deter, 
detect and disrupt.90  As Professor Kostant opines, “by greatly reducing the penalties for 
corporations that detect and disclose criminal activities, and requiring directors to 
cooperate in the prosecution of wrongdoers, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines offer a 
                                                 
84 E.g., Kostant, Breeding Better Watchdogs, supra note 14, at 1248. 
 
85 See Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. L. REV. 916, 951-58 (1998). 
 
86 For a well-known debate along these lines, see Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of 
Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission’s Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 963 (1994);  
Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 727  (1995); Joel Seligman, A Comment on 
Professor Grundfest’s “Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The 
Commission’s Authority,” 108 HARV. L. REV 438 (1994). 
 
87 Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53, 102-08 (2003) (providing a framework for 
choosing strict versus duty- or knowledge-based liability according to how equipped enforcement 
authorities are to enforce violations—the less equipped, the greater the need for strict liability and vice 
versa—and locating auditor performance under the knowledge-based end). 
 
88 Compare Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open Market Securities Frauds, 38 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 639, 657-62 (1996) (exploring parameters of potentially appropriate liability caps for non-privity 
federal securities fraud cases) with Harvey J. Goldschmid, Capping Securities Fraud Damages: An Unwise 
Proposal in an Imperfect World, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 665, 666-67(1996) (commenting on the foregoing article 
by Professor Langevoort and objecting to damages caps as risking integrity of securities markets by 
reducing managerial incentives to promote faithful financial reporting). 
 
89 See, e.g., Kraakman, Corporate Liability, supra note 5, at  867-68. 
 
90 Kostant, Breeding Better Watchdogs, supra note 14, at 1245, n. 146. 
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‘legal bribe’ to encourage gatekeeping.”91  These examples represent progress compared 
to the in terrorum approach of liability threats.  
 
C. Costs 
 
 The benefits of a regime of third-party liability discussed in the preceding section 
carry a number of costs.  First, associated duties entail time, effort, training and other 
costs of precaution and implementation.  Even the best-laid execution will not prevent 
mis-reporting.  The fraud artists who pass through the gate undetected create additional 
costs in legal liability, borne either by the subject gatekeeper or by insurance. Litigation 
and administration costs are considerable, including costs associated with defending 
against non-meritorious claims.  
 
 Second, liability risk can overshoot the mark, at least in some contexts. The risk 
of error may create excessive risk-aversion.92  Costs of a gatekeeper liability regime are 
increased (and otherwise unnecessary) compliance burdens on those predisposed to report 
fairly.  A related cost is how third-parties, reflecting their own liability risk, will charge a 
premium or require over-investment in enterprise compliance and control infrastructure. 
Related costs can be passed on to enterprises, ultimately increasing their cost of capital. 
Smaller businesses are invariably hurt disproportionately.  
 
 Third, and given scant attention in the literature, while liability risk may deter, it 
may also make gatekeepers unwilling to undertake functions that would otherwise be 
desirable for them to perform. For example, auditors always have resisted accepting any 
undertaking to detect for fraud or opine on the reasonableness of management’s 
accounting choices.93 Lawyers likewise resist imposition of any obligations that even 
remotely threaten the jealously guarded attorney-client privilege and doctrines of 
confidentiality.94 
 
II. FAILURE 
 
 This Part reviews the literature diagnosing the episodes of financial mis-reporting 
of the early 2000s that showed limitations on the traditional gatekeeping model.  Section 
A discusses diminished reputation constraints that affected partners, firms, and 
professions as a whole. Section B considers how reduced liability risk may have 
magnified these limitations.  Section C explores systemic features that pose inherent 
limitations for the traditional gatekeeping model.  In each case, discussion indicates how 
these limitations endure despite various reforms made in response to the period’s 
                                                 
91 Id. at n. 164 (citing Kraakman, Corporate Liability, supra note 5, at 70–71) (discussing the use of legal 
bribes to promote effective gatekeeping). 
 
92 See Choi, supra note 85, at 955 
 
93 See COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 9, at 166-68]; infra text accompanying notes 197-202. 
 
94 See McGowan, Why Not Try the Carrot?, supra note 4, at 1846-54. 
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transgressions. The analysis concludes that diagnosis and reform invariably focus on 
negative threats associated with reputation and liability risk but that a more promising 
avenue is to consider positive incentive programs. 
 
A. Diminished Reputation Constraints 
 
 The third-party model requires incentives for gatekeepers to turn away the 
inadmissible (or for whistleblowers to turn them in). A series of factors limiting the 
power of reputational constraints during the late 1990s and early 2000s may have 
impaired these incentives—at the levels of partners, firms and professions.  
 
 1. Partners — A common diagnosis of mis-aligned incentives considers the 
partner-level behavior of gatekeeper professionals. It makes the conventional supposition 
that it is irrational for a large firm (such as Arthur Andersen LLP) to sacrifice its 
reputational capital for a single enterprise (such as Enron Corp.) but it may not be 
irrational for particular partners to do so.95 This occurs when individual partners have 
only one client, making their career depend on pleasing its management.  
 
 According to this line of thought, “debacles like Enron’s were inevitable in an 
environment that rewards audit partners who are captured by their client and punishes 
those who report negative information about their clients through the proper corporate 
channels.”96 This diagnosis underscores the value of rewarding those who disrupt mis-
reporting. 
 
 A related diagnosis emphasizes how a firm that allows its partners’ careers to 
depend on single clients commits colossal error, compounded when the firm relies solely 
on that partner—or a small coterie working with that partner—for information about the 
engagement. Such a practice can impair the condition of independence necessary for 
effective gatekeeping.97 Yet it occurred at Enron and perhaps on other engagements.98 At 
minimum, these errors indicate superior methods of internal assignment allocation.  
 
 For lawyers, the one-client problem was less obvious, as most law firm partners 
provide the specialized services to a broad range of clients.99  On the other hand, some 
evidence from the period indicated a decline in this constraint for other reasons, chiefly 
when lawyers’ compensation was paid, in part, in equity in their client firms.100 This 
                                                 
95 See sources cited supra note 11. 
 
96 Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron, supra note 11, at 407–08. 
 
97 See supra text accompanying notes 48-52. 
 
98 Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron, supra note 11, at 410. 
 
99 See Coffee, The Attorney as Gatekeeper, supra note 35, at 1305–06 (noting that the one-client problem 
for audit partners can impair the reputational constraint at partner level but how this is not so at law firms).  
 
100 See Puri, supra note 48; see also John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, The Decline in Lawyer 
Independence: Lawyer Equity Investments in Clients, 81 TEX. L. REV. 405, 481–85 (2002) (discussing 
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problem could impair the reputational constraint at the partner level by a desire to 
increase the value of that equity, either to increase personal or firm wealth. 
 
 2. Firms — For many decades, the reputational constraint, backstopped by a 
modest threat of legal liability, satisfied the gatekeeper model’s requirements.101  But 
during the 1990s, a pillar of the reputational constraint changed, especially for audit 
firms.  During that period, the percentage of audit firm revenues from traditional auditing 
services shrank as revenues skyrocketed from consulting services (ranging from business 
strategy to technology management).102  The significant cross-selling of consulting 
services to a firm’s auditing clients meant that auditors would lose considerable 
consulting revenue if they were to sever clients or blow the whistle on them.103  
 
 Cross-selling essentially eliminated one of the vital guarantors of auditor 
independence: the strong signal emitted when an auditor severs a client relationship.104 
The signaling power when an auditor fires a client arises because the enterprise must 
have an auditor while the auditor need not retain any given client. Enterprises that 
auditors fire thus lose much more than the auditor loses. They may be unable to find any 
auditor at all after being severed.  The auditor may even gain reputation value from this 
sternness and this could enable it to attract new clients.105  
 
 Yet, during the 1990s, the incidence of auditor vetogating declined due to shifts in 
power from auditors to clients.106 According to this diagnosis, the existing auditing 
                                                                                                                                                 
traditional gatekeeper liability theory and noting controversy as to suitability of lawyers to perform the 
function); Christine Hurt, Counselor, Gatekeeper, Shareholder, Thief: Why Attorneys who Invest in their 
Clients in a Post-Enron World Are “Selling Out”, Not “Buying In,” 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 897, 935-38 (2005). 
 
101 See Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, supra note 9, at 1350. 
 
102 Prentice, Inevitability of a Strong SEC, supra note 10, at 786 (“[C]onsulting fees rose from seventeen 
percent of audit fees in 1990 to sixty-seven percent in 1999”) (citing Richard M. Frankel et al., The 
Relation Between Auditors’ Fees for Non-Audit Services and Earnings Management, 77 ACCT. REV. 
(Supp.) 71, 89 (2002)); Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, supra note 9, at 1350 
(describing how fees from audit clients for non-audit services rose from 13% of revenues in the 1970s to 
50% of revenues in the 1990s). 
 
103 Professor Prentice documents factors that had the same weakening effect at all other gatekeepers, 
including lawyers, analysts, rating agencies, bankers, mutual funds and stock exchanges. See Prentice, 
Inevitability of a Strong SEC, supra note 10, at 786–98. 
 
104 See Jeffrey N. Gordon What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business 
Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1237 (2002) (most important guarantor of 
auditor independence is saliency of auditor terminations, a material event that must promptly be disclosed, 
but the value of which drops dramatically when audit firms cross-sell consulting services which give 
auditor incentives not to sever clients). 
 
105 The danger in this structure—also true of a rewards program—is auditor strategic behavior, in which 
they fire entirely responsible clients to shine their image and attract other shinier clients. See, e.g., Macey & 
Sale, Observations on the Role of Commodification, supra note 11, at 1176. The effect, in any event, is a 
kind of balance of power between enterprises and auditors, one of “mutual reputation enhancement.” Id. 
 
106 Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron, supra note 11, at 409. 
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structure “will not function properly until a lead audit partner can confidently fire a 
dishonest client without jeopardizing his career.”107 In the period after the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act became law, the number of audit firms firing clients increased dramatically.108  
 
 It is hard to determine exactly why auditors increasingly severed clients during 
this period.  Some evidence indicates a tendency to sever smaller enterprises not larger 
ones,109 even though all frauds leading to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act involved large 
enterprises.110  Moreover, Sarbanes-Oxley does not ban all non-audit services, leaving a 
large exception for tax services to clients.111  This is both lucrative and a context in which 
acute risk of illegality and fraud appear.112 Accordingly, while these reforms respond 
proportionately to a firm-level factor that reduced the reputational constraint’s power, 
more policy levers may need plying. 
 
 3. Professions — Auditing industry concentration may have increased erosion of 
audit quality.  Mergers during the 1990s reduced the number of large audit firms from 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
107 Id. 
 
108 See Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure and Reform, supra note 20, at 348, n. 148 (“In 2003, over 1460 public 
companies changed auditors, which was the highest number in at least five years. Although such switches 
could be because the client was dissatisfied with the auditor, many were because the auditor considered the 
client too risky—or because the auditor raised its fees in light of that increased risk. . . . By itself, this 
evidence may not prove that auditors are becoming significantly more selective with regard to clients, but it 
is at least consistent with such a hypothesis.”). 
 
109 An extensive contemporary and historical literature investigates the multiple aspects of auditor 
switching. Among recent contributions suggesting that increased switching after Sarbanes-Oxley is not 
strictly due to those reforms but at least potentially related to client size, see Michael Ettredge, Chan Li & 
Susan Scholz, Audit Fees and Auditor Realignments in the Sarbanes-Oxley Era, U. Kansas Working Paper 
(Nov. 2005) (“[A]uditors tend to resign from companies that pay relatively lower fees [and those] whose 
auditors resign also are characterized by smaller size, negative income (losses), and prior receipt of going 
concern audit reports”); see also Wayne R. Landsman, Karen K. Nelson & Brian R. Rountree, An 
Empirical Analysis of Big N Auditor Switches (2005) (detailing pre-SOX study of switches during 1993 to 
2001 showing that resignations of large audit firms commonly result in the client engaging another large 
audit firm). 
 
110 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Might 
Just Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 923–28 (2003) (chronicling the road to SOX from the implosion of the 
“Big Four Frauds,” referring to Qwest Communications, Inc.; WorldCom, Inc.; Global Crossing, Ltd.; and 
Enron Corp., and noting that the statute takes the unusual step for legislation of mentioning the latter two 
by name). 
 
111 See Matthew J. Barrett, “Tax Services” as a Trojan Horse in the Auditor Independence Provisions of 
Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 463, 485-502 (noting continuing auditor dependence on clients to 
whom they render tax services which are still allowed). 
 
112 See United States v. Stein, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42915, [pin cite] (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2006); United 
States v. KPMG LLP, 316 F. Supp. 2d 30, [pin cite] (D.D.C. 2004) (facts at preliminary stage of Internal 
Revenue Service and Department of Justice investigations into criminal conduct at KPMG, which 
eventually led to the firm’s narrowly escaping a criminal indictment); see also Sheldon D. Pollack & Jay A. 
Soled, Tax Professionals Behaving Badly, 105 TAX NOTES 201, 210 (2004).  
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eight to five and the dissolution of Arthur Andersen reduced it further to the current 
four.113 These firms are massive compared to the next largest firms, with annual revenue 
at the four large firms reaching $20 billion compared to $1 billion for the next largest 
firms.114  This concentration in the industry’s upper tier reduces the importance of 
product differentiation.115  With a large number of firms, competition can concentrate on 
product differentiation, including investment in reputation; with so few firms, reduced 
competition diminishes incentives to invest in reputation and thus diminishes the power 
of the reputational constraint.116  
 
 A final—and pervasive—limitation on gatekeeping efficacy is how the enterprise 
pays the gatekeeper.117  That creates an inherent inclination for solicitude, simply to 
retain business. Numerous solutions to this limitation have been proposed, some applied 
to auditors and some to other intermediaries. Examples include using insurance 
markets,118 public funding,119 funding through stock exchanges120 or voucher financing 
programs.121  
 
 None of these has been adopted in the United States.  Instead, the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act adopts a more cautious ground.  This reposes in an issuer’s board audit committee the 
authority to determine auditor compensation (and other auditor oversight, including 
                                                 
113 See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Public Accounting Firms: Mandated Study on Consolidation and 
Competition, supra note 10, at 16, 20–22. 
 
114 See id. 
 
115 See Theodore Eisenberg & Jonathan R. Macey, Was Arthur Andersen Different? An Empirical 
Examination of Major Accounting Firm Audits of Large Clients, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 263, 297–98 
(2004)); Eric L. Talley, Cataclysmic Liability Risk among Big-Four Auditors, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 
[pin cite] (2006). 
 
116 O’Connor, Be Careful What you Wish For, supra note 10, at 787–88; Prentice, Inevitability of a Strong 
SEC, supra note 10, at 786. 
 
117 Coffee, What Caused Enron?, supra note 15, at 279–80 (noting that gatekeeper utility is limited because 
paid by party to be monitored). 
 
118  Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers, supra note 19, at 427-41 (instead of having companies pay 
auditors, authorizing them to buy insurance and having insurers hire and pay auditors). 
 
119 Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1, 29, n. 180 (suggesting but discounting possibility of having gatekeepers such as auditors paid 
through public funding). 
 
120 Larry E. Ribstein, SarbOx: The Road to Nirvana, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 279, 289 (citing Paul M. 
Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, How the Quest for Efficiency Corroded the Market, HARV. BUS. REV., July 
2003, at 76 (having the stock exchanges coordinate and compensate auditors)).  
 
121 Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing Proposal for Securities 
Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269, 314-28 (2003). 
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retention and dismissal).122  One benefit of this approach is that audit committees can be 
conceptualized as gatekeepers, of a fashion, and there is some theoretical support for 
believing that having one gatekeeper pay another is an effective way to increase overall 
gatekeeping effectiveness.123 
 
B. Reduced Liability Risk 
 
 Several legal changes during the 1990s reduced the exposure of secondary actors 
to legal liability for failure to promote fair reporting.  First, the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) changed the liability regime from joint-and-several 
liability to proportionate so that gatekeepers no longer are liable for the entirety of 
damages but only for their share of culpability.124  Second, the Supreme Court held that 
the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws do not reach those who aid or abet 
others in mis-reporting.125  While this did not prevent SEC actions under that theory, it 
significantly curtailed private actions.126 Such changes reduced the legal liability threat, 
which could have been a factor in declining propensity to protect reputations for integrity 
as gatekeepers (or whistleblowers).127  When combined with the other factors noted 
above, incentives for quality gatekeeping declined.128  
 
 A related diagnostic concerning audit firms is based on changing forms of liability 
structures.129 Audit firms shifted from partnerships to limited liability entities.130 This 
                                                 
122 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 301, codified in 15 U.S.C. § ___. 
 
123  COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 9, at 166-68; see infra text accompanying note 219 (one feature of 
the rewards system is the possibility of securities underwriters paying bonuses to auditors). 
 
124 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, 758 codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4.  
 
125 Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994). In May 2007, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Stoneridge Investments v. Scientific Atlanta, to be heard in the 2007-08 
Term, giving the Court an opportunity to elucidate this body of law. 
 
126 See Talley, Cataclysmic Liability Risk, supra note 115, at 1650-51 & 1656-57 (the percentage of federal 
securities fraud class actions naming auditors as defendants decreased considerably since the Supreme 
Court announced that federal securities laws do not authorize private securities fraud actions against those 
aiding and abetting securities fraud). 
 
127 Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, supra note 9, at 1350 (noting that during the 
1990s, the legal liability threat to auditors declined and this, coupled with other factors, contributed to a 
greater willingness to risk the firms’ reputational capital). 
 
128 See COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 9, at 152–56; Bratton, Shareholder Value and Auditor 
Independence, supra note 9, at 470 (attributing source of audit gatekeeping deterioration to reduced 
liability risk, and concomitant decline in auditors’ traditional modes of independence and conservatism, 
plus the transformation of their consulting work into a high-return premium business carrying a suitably 
high risk for the auditor’s reputational capital). 
 
129 Macey & Sale, Observations on the Role of Commodification, supra note 11, at 1180. 
 
130 Ribstein, supra note 11, at 447. 
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reduced incentives to maintain internal control, as litigation risk fell along with concern 
with steps that would reduce it.131 At least in the case of Enron, this diagnosis concludes, 
“[i]t seems doubtful that this situation would have existed if the firm had been operating 
under a legal regime in which partners were jointly and severally liable for negligence, 
audits were tied to reputation and not sold as commodities, and auditors were truly 
independent.”132 
 
 Much more could be said about the sources of litigation risk and how they change 
over time through doctrinal evolution or regulatory reform.  As the discussion of liability 
risk in the previous section attests, it is notoriously difficult to use alternative legal 
designs to achieve desired results.133  It is particularly perplexing to meet the specific 
objective of setting an optimal level of deterrence.134  
 
 That discussion also shows how fair it is to say that the role of liability risk is a 
dominant feature of the scholarly literature.  Perhaps more litigation risk helps to reverse 
certain causes of gatekeeper failure. But further discussion of that strategy in this review 
will not advance that cause.  Indeed, the following discussion identifies systemic factors 
that impair gatekeeper effectiveness, most of which are beyond the reach of any liability 
threats to control. 
 
C. Systemic Factors 
 
 Systemic features of the gatekeeping landscape can influence its effectiveness. 
Two broad forces appeared to operate during the late 1990s when considerable 
limitations in the gatekeeper model appeared.  
 
 First, the era was characterized by financial euphoria.135 A technological 
revolution occurred that altered means and methods of doing business and of many forms 
of human activity.  In this and other such periods, a critical mass of persons throughout 
all sectors of society—including enterprises and investors and their professional advisors 
and gatekeepers—came to assume that a new era had emerged, for which the traditional 
norms of business and standards of accounting were less suited.136  It becomes easy in 
such periods to suspend critical judgment, including as to conventional matters of 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
131 Id. 
 
132 Macey & Sale, Observations on the Role of Commodification, supra note 11, at 1181. 
 
133 See supra text accompanying notes 73-91; see also John Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits 
of Institutional Tort Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1929, [pin cite] (1988).  
 
134 See COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 9, at 61 (discussing the decline of deterrence). 
 
135 See ROBERT SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE passum (2d ed. 2005). 
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corporate governance and financial reporting.  Any gatekeeping model will suffer serious 
stress in such periods.137 
 
 Second, a systemic emphasis on gatekeepers can backfire. Gatekeepers stake 
reputations and liability only to the extent that there is at least a reasonable chance that 
mis-reporting will be uncovered in circumstances that damage reputation and create legal 
liability. But, especially during a euphoric period, and when gatekeepers are the 
centerpiece of a regime’s integrity, professionals may believe that their transgressions can 
escape notice. If the system relies on gatekeepers to promote fair reporting, and 
gatekeepers know that, it is not irrational for gatekeepers to believe that they can conceal 
complicity.  
 
 For this reason, more elaborate gatekeeping theories emphasize using a multitude 
of gatekeepers as cross-checks, so that no one gatekeeper can ensure permanent 
concealment.138  Alas, in euphoric periods, even a well-thatched mass of cross-checking 
gatekeepers can be of limited effect.  Collective suspension of objectivity can induce 
mutual myopia, as when auditors defer to lawyers who approve an approach to a 
reporting question while lawyers defer to the auditors who do so.139 
 
 The bubble problem is recurring rather than continuing.  Other cultural factors of 
a more enduring nature can impair gatekeeper effectiveness.  Critical to success is having 
individuals within professional firms capable of advancing and protecting the firm’s 
reputation.  This bonding is more likely in cultures where individuals enjoy and expect to 
have long-term relationships with a single firm.  In recent generations, however, cultural 
forces have led to far greater mobility among professionals, such as auditors and 
lawyers.140  They move from firm to firm more often than in previous generations.  This 
reduces the bonding between individuals and firms and related individual incentives to 
advance and protect firm reputations.141  
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 Bonding also was impaired when clients began more frequently to use different 
firms for different kinds of services; for example, when an enterprise that once used a 
single outside law firm for nearly all its legal needs increasingly began to use numerous 
different firms.142  That too breaks long-term bonds that concentrate on advancing and 
protecting reputations for candor and integrity in securities disclosure.  Likewise, more 
frequent mergers among professional service firms—now common among law firms—
reduces bonding value.143 
 
 Behavioral psychology contributes further explanations for why gatekeepers 
depart from the rationality-based assumptions of reputational constraints against 
misbehavior. First, gatekeepers may succumb to biases and use heuristics that prevent 
exercising best judgment.144 Among numerous examples are the self-serving bias and the 
commitment bias, which can afflict auditors, lawyers and other gatekeepers.145 The first 
refers to a tendency to interpret data and assess uncertainty according to one’s own self-
interest.  The second refers to a tendency to continue to believe positions one already has 
taken, which can induce continued confidence in mistaken beliefs instead of correcting 
them using new information.  
 
 Structural devices can address such biases.  For auditors, self-serving bias can be 
neutralized by reposing auditor supervision in audit committees and commitment bias by 
rotating audit partners through different auditing engagements.146  Harder to combat are 
more general behavioral biases known as “backward recursion” and the “time delay 
trap.”147  These biases incline people to discount the significance of future events or 
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circumstances, even those posing high magnitude consequences, and to value instant 
gratification at higher levels than equal measures of deferred gratification.148  
 
 While all of the foregoing systemic factors contribute partial explanations for 
gatekeeper failure, associated analysis and reforms tend to revolve around the scholarly 
literature’s enduring focus on reputation constraints plus liability risk.149  These systemic 
factors are taken to explain why reputation assumes lesser importance in certain market 
environments.150  Reforms tend to focus either on reinvestment in reputations or 
enhanced litigation threats.  An important oversight in such a framework is how liability 
risk can induce gatekeepers to invest, not in reputations for effectiveness, but in 
campaigns to limit or eliminate the scope and type of their undertakings.  
 
 Examples of how increased litigation risk results in gatekeeper pushback include 
(a) for auditors, resisting any undertaking to opine on the reasonableness of accounting 
principles that management selects or to detect for fraud; and (b) for lawyers, resisting 
any duty to conduct due diligence or to opine on disclosure integrity to constituents other 
than a client’s board of directors (or, in some circumstances, a securities underwriter).151 
In each case, a Catch 22 appears: without litigation risk, gatekeepers acquiesce but with 
it, they want limited responsibilities.  While a system reliant on reputation and litigation 
risk cannot unwind this conundrum, adding a carrot-based merit component to the system 
might help.  
 
III. INCENTIVE REWARDS 
 
 This Part explores how developing positive incentives or rewards can promote 
more effective capital market gatekeeping.  Section A outlines the intuition and sketches 
a formal general model.  Section B considers practical steps required to implement such 
rewards.  This emphasizes and illustrates private arrangements that can be designed to 
adjust existing incentives.  Section C turns to how public recognition can contribute 
additional incentives at very low cost.  
 
A.  General Model 
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149 See, e.g., COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 9, at 5 (“both strategies (i.e., both legal remedies and 
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 This section outlines a general model of incentives for gatekeepers.  It begins with 
the intuitive motivation followed by an account of the model under assumptions of 
rationality and then under assumptions of behavioral economics. 
 
 1. Intuition — Popular corporate governance strategies include incentives 
designed to align principal-agent interests.152  The most conspicuous of these are 
executive compensation packages tied to corporate performance.153  Stock options are the 
most common form of these incentives.  They epitomize the intuition behind any merit 
system: stock options give managers incentives to increase stock price. Critics debate the 
effectiveness of these devices, however, with some asserting that they overreach by 
tempting managers to provide misleading reporting to inflate stock price artificially.154     
 
 If the benefits of stock options are real, as devotees contend, similar benefits 
should accrue from awarding analogous options to gatekeepers.  If the deleterious effects 
of stock options are real, as critics claim, an ideal response is to offer countervailing 
incentives to gatekeepers to neutralize those effects.  If risk of misleading reporting 
increases in tandem with stock-based compensation, a precise antidote is merit-based 
gatekeeping to offset that increase. 
 
 The intuition is akin to a hypothetical model of incentive compensation that 
Warren Buffett offered concerning investment banking services. At a symposium 
discussing how boards of directors assess mergers, Mr. Buffett considered the role that 
advisors play, especially investment bankers.155 Many investment bankers charge 
contingent fees for merger transactions, giving them strong incentives to close a deal 
even if not in the client’s interests. 
 
 To correct for this perversion, Mr. Buffett quipped as follows: “If I’m going to 
pay $5 million to somebody if they give me the advice and the deal goes through, then I 
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think I probably ought to pay $5 million to somebody else whose advice I listen to who 
gets paid the $5 million only if the deal doesn’t go through.”156  Similarly, if shareholders 
pay senior executives incentive compensation to achieve designated corporate 
performance measures, they should be willing to pay gatekeepers incentive compensation 
to assure that achieving them is done using fair reporting.  
 
 This intuition can be amplified by insights that Professor Painter contributed 
concerning law firms in merger transactions.157  Some law firms also use contingent 
compensation arrangements, sometimes with disastrous consequences for shareholders of 
their clients.  Professor Painter instances a $35 million contingent fee that Time-Warner 
Co. paid to a law firm upon the closing of its merger with America-On-Line (AOL).158  
The price Time-Warner paid for AOL in that merger was exorbitant and wound up 
costing its shareholders some $200 billion in investment value.159  As with Mr. Buffett’s 
quip about bankers, Time-Warner shareholders would likely have benefited if the 
company paid one law firm $35 million if the deal closed and another firm $35 million if 
it did not.   
 
 This example furnishes additional intuitive support favoring an incentives 
program for gatekeepers. Enterprises can promote effective gatekeeping by deploying 
two teams of lawyers rather than one.  Moreover, to correct this problem, Professor 
Painter advocated banning lawyer contingent fees in corporate transactions.160 This 
sensible proposal is akin to existing bans against auditors from charging clients 
contingent fees.161 The rationale is to impair managerial power to bribe gatekeepers into 
complicity. 
 
 An additional step could strengthen gatekeeper effectiveness.  It would provide 
for contingent fees for gatekeepers (auditors or lawyers) who discover and correct mis-
reporting under circumstances when they otherwise had no legal obligation to do so.  
This would not require amending the ban on auditors charging contingent fees or 
interfere with imposing one on transactional lawyers.162  Auditors (and lawyers) would 
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still charge fees for professional services as under current practice.  They would also earn 
additional fees upon discovery of errors or irregularities not otherwise within their 
existing responsibilities to uncover or disclose.163  
 
 An incentives program can respond to some of the diagnoses of gatekeeper failure 
noted earlier in this Article.  First, it generally is agreed that wide-scale marketing of 
consulting services by auditors gives managers considerable power over them.164  Firing 
an auditor for being tough is a red flag to the market, but firing an auditor from its non-
audit services is not.  Managers offered a carrot while holding out a stick: a favorable 
audit in exchange for lucrative consulting assignments.  Auditors in the consulting 
business may have offered favorably lax audits to generate more assignments.165  As 
Professor Coffee says, “the carrot works better than the stick, precisely because the threat 
to take the carrot away [can be] more credible.”166  
 
 This insight suggests inverting the policy experience. If auditors who are paid 
bonuses to do consulting work became more lax on audits, then paying them bonuses for 
fraud detection and discovery should improve audit effectiveness. During the 1990s, 
firms adopted the business model that rewarded audit partners for generating consulting 
work.  It should be attractive to let firms adopt the business model that rewards audit 
partners for generating fraud-detection work. This would provide additional 
compensation for success in performing a watchdog function in addition to the existing 
regime that imposes liability risks. 
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 Second, a common diagnosis of the reputational constraint failure is how a firm’s 
and a partner’s incentives may differ.167  Professor Coffee responds that, while plausible, 
this diagnosis is incomplete.  If a firm really sought to protect its reputation, then it would 
control those persons through mandatory rotation of assignments or by imposing caps on 
non-audit revenue they could earn.168 This response, which seems correct, also 
contributes to the intuitive case for creating gatekeeper incentives.  If firms wished to 
pursue the ends as Professor Coffee hypothesizes, then an internal merit system, such as 
awarding points or compensation for fraud detection, should be attractive. 
 
 Third,  the standard conception of auditor reputation emphasizes investor 
assessment of auditor integrity—a conception that applies equally to other gatekeepers.169 
So viewed, carrots play no obvious role—integrity reflects a “disclose if detected” 
approach. But if one emphasizes a gatekeeper’s reputation with management for 
toughness, carrots become more obvious tools.  Given the inherent limits that gatekeepers 
face in testing the veracity of managerial assertions, reducing mis-reporting requires 
managers to believe that gatekeepers are ruthless.  That reputation can be enhanced by 
rewarding them for successful detection and correction of mis-reporting. 
 
 Finally, some believe that lawyers who were paid in equity securities of clients 
suffered impaired judgment as a result.170 This can be akin to the downside of 
compensating managers using stock options. While both tools can tend to align the 
interests of the gatekeepers/agents with those of the principal, they also can overreach 
and induce acquiescence in mis-reporting. This likewise suggests inverting the 
experience.  Instead of compensating gatekeepers in client equity securities, positive 
incentives should be offered in cash and paid as bonuses for discovering mis-reporting.  
 
 2. The Model Under Rationality Assumptions — A basic formal model of 
gatekeeper decision-making compares the gains from acquiescence to the expected costs 
of inculpation.  An incentives program adds gains from vetogating to the model, which 
must be sufficient to tip the balance for both firms and individuals.  The following 
discussion presents a general model of this calculus, divided into three sub-parts: (a) a 
cost-benefit calculus; (b) estimating optimal gatekeeper payoffs; and (c) some alternative 
approaches and variations for specific situations.  The discussion in this section proceeds 
on the assumption of economic rationality among actors; the next section considers the 
model under behavioral assumptions. 
 
a. Cost-Benefit Calculus.  
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 Professor Kraakman’s original formulation of the gatekeeping model identifies 
effective gatekeepers as those with incentives that differ from clients in that they have 
“less to gain and more to lose” from granting capital market access to clients who mis-
report.171   Gatekeepers stand to the value of the bribe and stand to lose reputation value 
and liability costs.  Neglected in this and kindred formulations is what gatekeepers have 
to gain from turning the petitioner away—true, they have to gain a good reputation with 
instrumental value.  But just as the one side of the equation emphasizes “more to lose” in 
both reputation impairment and legal liability and the other side emphasizes “less to 
gain” from complicity, the formula should also emphasize “more to gain” from 
disruption. 
 
 A simple fact pattern illustrates. In connection with a pending transaction, a 
corporate employee commits fraud (say booking false revenues).  Gatekeepers participate 
in generating related documentation (say investment bankers draft, auditors certify and 
lawyers conform in disclosure documents). The gatekeepers have duties in respect of the 
transaction and also opportunities apart from those duties to become aware of the fraud. 
For each, gatekeepers must decide whether to perform their duties (and, if they discover 
anything, to correct, disclose or withdraw) and whether to perform additional tasks, not 
otherwise required, that may uncover it (and then face the same set of alternative 
decisions).  
 
 In each case, a complex set of costs and benefits appear.  Benefits of complicity at 
each step include fees from the pending transaction, the present value of probable future 
fees from other transactions, and any slice of the fraud such as bribes to acquiesce. Costs 
of complicity include the discounted probability of inculpation. Following most 
gatekeeper theory, the gatekeepers wish to preserve and promote a reputation for veracity 
and thoroughness and thus see complicity as posing a potential cost in reputation. In 
some cases, the gatekeeper may prefer a reputation for complicity and thus make the 
opposite calculation.172 Setting those latter cases aside for the moment, the following 
formulation captures the elements of these decisions:173 
 
BF < > P[d] * { ( P[e] * L[l] ) + L[r] } 
                                                 
171 Kraakman, Corporate Liability, supra note 5, at 891 (emphasis added). 
 
172 It is possible for reputation effects of effective gatekeeping to be a negative. See McGowan, Why Not 
Try the Carrot?, supra note 4, at 1828 (contending that reputation effects of effective gatekeeping by 
lawyers can either be a benefit (if clients like reputable gatekeepers) or a cost (if clients like compliant 
gatekeepers)). If so, this makes for a difficult theoretical case about the possibility that lawyers can be 
gatekeepers. It runs counter to the basic theory of gatekeeping. Professor McGowan assumes that clients 
dislike whistle-blowing lawyers because it increases transaction costs. While acknowledging the possibility 
that such action benefits clients by signaling to third parties a trustworthy client, Professor McGowan 
believes that if this were so, one would observe more whistle-blowing than we actually observe. But this 
hypothesis seems to overlook how whistle-blowing is an ex post action whereas gatekeeping is an ex ante 
action. From this distinction, one might infer from relatively low levels of observed whistle-blowing that 
high levels of effective gatekeeping exist.  
 
173 Gerding, The Next Epidemic, supra note 16, at 426–28. 
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where: 
 
BF    = benefits from fraud (of complicity in mis-reporting) 
P[d] = probability of detection 
P[e] = probability of enforcement 
L[1] = legal liability  
L[r] = reputation damage. 
 
 This formula expresses the relationship between the benefits of complicity on the 
left hand and the costs of inculpation on the right. It captures how rational actors will 
facilitate mis-reporting when the benefits from fraud, BF, exceed expected total costs.  
Expected total costs depend initially on the probability of detection, P[d]. Assuming 
detection occurs, then expected legal liability is the product of the probability of 
successful enforcement, P[e], and associated legal liability if so, L[1]. Expected total 
costs add reputation damage, L[r], to that result.  
 
 Recall how assessments in the literature, including diagnoses of the Enron era, 
highlight mis-aligned incentives and under-deterrence from inadequate liability risk.174 
The foregoing formula captures these, respectively, in the magnitude of the benefits from 
fraud (complicity in mis-reporting), BF, and the magnitude of legal liability, L[1]. The 
mis-aligned incentives thesis as applied to gatekeepers supposes that BF was too high 
compared to L[r] and the legal liability thesis supposes that L[1] was too low compared 
to the optimal level. 
 
 Recall also how the literature has said little about incentive compensation from 
disrupting mis-reporting. The literature concentrates almost entirely on the mis-aligned 
incentives and legal liability theses. If carrots were added, the gatekeeper’s decision 
would include weighing the payoff that she would earn from disrupting mis-reporting.  In 
the formula, this means adding a new variable to the right side to capture this gatekeeper 
payoff, as follows:  
 
BF < > P[d] * {(P[e] * L[l]) + L[r]} + GP 
 
where 
 
GP = gatekeeper payoff from effective gatekeeping (i.e., incentive payments received for 
disrupting mis-reporting). 
 
 For convenience, in the ensuing discussion, the components of this expanded 
formula will be referred to as follows: GP for these newly-added gatekeeper payoffs, BF 
for the benefits of mis-reporting and TC for the total expected costs of inculpation [P[d] 
* {(P[e] * L[l]) + L[r]}].  
 
                                                 
174 See supra text accompanying notes 95-134. 
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b. Optimal Gatekeeper Payoffs.  
 
 The level of gatekeeper payoffs (GP) must be sufficient so that the benefits of 
mis-reporting are less than the sum of the total costs of inculpation plus gatekeeper 
payoffs frrm effective gatekeeping.  In the formula’s terms, GP must exceed BF – TC (so 
that BF < TC + GP). 
 
 The required gatekeeper payoff (the amount of GP) will vary with attributes of 
different professions, functions and environments.  But to offer a sense of the parameters, 
it should be possible to hazard reasonable theoretical approximations of minimum and 
maximum levels.  The minimum GP might be approximated by reference to a deciding 
agent’s opportunity cost—a portion of BF.  A maximum level might be approximated by 
reference to the next best deterrence strategy.  Appreciating that these are analytical and 
illustrative rather than scientific or definitive, consider each in detail. 
 
 As to approximating the minimum gatekeeper payoff (GP), gatekeeping firms 
should compensate members to motivate them to build the firm’s long-term reputation 
but, for firms, retention requires meeting employee opportunity costs.175  A professional’s 
opportunity costs—gains available from the next best option—are determined largely by 
the managers with whom she regularly interacts, meaning clients, whose assessments of a 
professional’s reputation is significant (for example, they will be asked to provide 
references should the professional later seek new employment). This can put her 
allegiances with those persons, not with her firm. This increases the firms costs of 
monitoring her clients. To neutralize this, a minimum GP would be that amount 
necessary to bond the professional’s interests to the firm’s long-term reputation. In this 
approximation, that is the amount of those opportunity costs. 
 
 As to approximating the maximum gatekeeping payoff (GP), it must be no greater 
than the next best alternative strategy (if it were greater, then the alternative would be 
superior). For illustration, among candidates for the next best deterrence strategy is a 
legal regime that imposes vicarious personal liability on partners of the deciding actor’s 
firm. Partner X is liable for violations of Partner Y. This increases incentives that Partner 
X has to monitor Partner Y.  But as Professor Ribstein explains, “this liability may be 
ineffective because it places risk on those who are ill-situated to prevent harm.”176 Thus, 
such a system of negative threats may create excessive incentives for internal monitoring 
and yet remain ineffective.  
 
 As a next-best strategy, the alternative can be used to approximate a maximum 
level of gatekeeper payoff (GP). Using incentive contracts, Partner Y earns rewards that 
reduce the need for Partner X to monitor Partner Y.  Rather than impose vicarious 
liability on Partner X for “wrongs” of Partner Y, the program awards Partner Y bonuses 
for “rights” that reduce Partner X’s need to monitor Partner Y. The maximum GP, then, 
                                                 
175 Ribstein, supra note 120, at 288–289.  
 
176  Ribstein, Limited Liability of Professional Firms, supra note 11, at 447. 
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would be the cost to Partner X of engaging in such oversight (again, if GP were more 
than that, the vicarious deterrence alternative would be superior).177 
 
c. Other Approaches and Specifications.  
 
 Other avenues for estimating the parameters or ranges of optimal gatekeeper 
payoffs (GP) are possible.  I provide the foregoing examples to suggest the model’s 
feasibility rather than to delineate it completely.  In the same vein, it may be useful to 
consider alternatives to the existing stick-oriented gatekeeper regime and examples of 
specifications that may be useful in developing an incentives program. 
 
 As to approaches other than adding incentives for gatekeepers, some critics 
lament the limitations on the reputational constraint—manifested by the discrete and 
cumulative failures of private gatekeeping.  They prescribe displacing it altogether in 
favor of an emboldened public enforcement program through a strengthened SEC.178   
This is extreme because it removes other benefits of the private gatekeeping model, 
which is far less intrusive than would be an SEC or other purely public model.179  
Perhaps it is a superior policy prescription.  It is intended to increase the expected total 
costs of inculpation (TC) through regulatory empowerment.  Yet it may be more prudent 
to continue to work with the existing model by adding gains from gatekeeping (GP) 
before taking such a radical move.  It addresses the misaligned incentives problem by 
offering short-term personal gain not to be in on the fraud.  
 
 Another alternative to adding gatekeeper payoff incentives is to manipulate the 
expected total costs of inculpation (TC) using devices other than cash. Professor 
McGowan proposed that securities lawyers who are first to disrupt mis-reporting be 
rewarded with transactional immunity from any related prosecution.180 This is a valuable 
contribution to the literature.  Yet it is a narrow change: it applies only to lawyers for a 
limited whistle-blowing function and provides the carrot of lenity (which may be 
perceived as a lighter stick than a carrot).  This Article is exploring a broader model for 
use by all gatekeepers and contemplates paying cash (and providing other forms of public 
recognition as noted in the next section).  
 
 This exploration is thus more general, which means that the foregoing model 
requires specification for particular applications. First, it requires specification according 
to the professional identify of different gatekeepers. What works for auditors may not 
work for lawyers. An important issue is how to interpret the reputational constraint. For 
                                                 
177 Again, these are approximations of parameters, intended to support a view of the model as reasonable, 
not scientific determinations. 
 
178 See Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, supra note 10, at ___. 
 
179 Regulators are not generally seen as gatekeepers.  See Oh, supra note 16. 
 
180 McGowan, Why Not Try the Carrot?, supra note 4, at 1837-38 & 1840 (proposing transactional 
immunity to the first securities lawyer to blow the whistle about an unlawful transaction). 
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auditors, all seem to agree that enforcement and compelling disclosure increase 
reputation value whereas, for lawyers, scholars debate whether a reputation for 
complicity is more valuable than one for probity.181 In the foregoing model, this 
difference between auditors and lawyers concerns whether to locate reputation, [r], on 
the left or right side of the formula. While [r]’s location influences the required amount 
of gatekeeper payoffs (GP), explicitly adding that variable to the calculus is useful under 
either assumption. 
 
 An incentives program requires specification for variations among gatekeepers 
and whistleblowers (and hybrids).  As traditionally defined, gatekeepers are present to 
prevent access to capital markets or to correct mis-reporting before granting access.182  
They bear duties to do so and may be more often exposed to bribes for complicity.  
Whistleblowers traditionally report after a violation has occurred and a party has passed 
through the gate and accessed capital markets.183  Whistle-blowers often do not have 
duties to report so those engaged in mis-reporting may be less conscious of the value of 
offering bribes to them.  Accordingly, relationships between benefits of complicity and 
costs of inculpation vary as between gatekeepers and whistleblowers (and hybrids). These 
differences do not alter the basic relationships between benefits and costs in the general 
model but would require specification for particular applications. 
 
 3. The Model Under Behavioral Assumptions — Turn from the rational cost-
benefit calculus to some critiques from behavioral economics.  Professor Prentice 
identifies two important behavioral limitations on the reputational constraint: backward 
recursion and a time delay trap. Both limitations can be neutralized using the right 
positive incentives.184  
 
First, consider backward recursion, where short-term returns from dishonesty 
dwarf future benefits from honesty.185  This problem is acute in certain settings, including 
end-game contexts (say, a person near retirement or a firm near dissolution), internal 
principal-agent contexts (where a firm’s reputation counts but an individual member gets 
little benefit from it), or when gains to individuals exceed probable future losses or 
through mis-estimation of any of these and related penalties.186  
 
                                                 
181 See supra text accompanying notes 69-72. 
 
182 See supra text accompanying notes 13-24. 
 
183 See supra text accompanying notes 25-35. 
 
184 See Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations Regarding 
Proposals for Its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397, 1427, 1429–34 (2002) (critique of reputational constraint 
based on six countervailing factors); see also Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor 
Governance, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767 (2002). 
 
185 Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, supra note 10, at 798, n. 142. 
 
186 Id. 
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 While an incentives program may not eliminate these biases—especially the risk 
of mis-estimation—it help to counteract them.187 It would increase the short-term returns 
from honesty.  It can surgically respond to settings where risks of backward recursion are 
acute.  For end-games, it increases retirement resources and firm solvency; it closes the 
reputation gap that arises from mis-aligned incentives.  If gatekeeper payoffs (PF) are 
sufficiently large relative to the difference between benefits from complicity (BF) and 
expected costs of inculpation (TC), positive incentives can reduce the risk of mis-
estimation.  
 
 Second, gatekeepers may suffer from a time-delay trap.188 The trap arises when 
people over-value instant gratification.189  Gatekeepers may under-appreciate the long-
term effects of building a reputation, which may take years, delaying gratification.190 This 
condition manifests in improper activities promising immediate payoffs if either detection 
is unlikely in the long-term or the long-term is sufficiently distant to be discounted into 
immateriality. Self-serving bias can exacerbate this condition when people assess 
information supporting self-interest, as by rationalizing fraudulent schemes.  Carrots 
counteract these biases.  Cash paid today offset the discounting effect by providing 
gatekeepers immediate rewards.  Cash compensates gatekeepers for not being in on a 
scheme, reducing the likelihood that they will overlook the long-term risks of liability. 
 
 Professor Painter notes that regulations do little to address cognitive biases 
gatekeepers may face.191 As examples, commitment bias can induce auditors to hide post-
reporting discoveries or induce lawyers to adhere to previous assessments of the 
probability of litigation outcomes despite new information tending to contradict the 
assessment.192  The resulting biased judgments can infect related disclosure.  Among 
solutions to such problems are to use audit committees as auditor supervisors, as required 
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, or to obtain a second lawyers’ opinion (an option but not a 
regulatory requirement).  Neither solution is perfect or complete—adding an incentives 
program can reduce the imperfections further.193  
                                                 
187 Biases may complicate estimating the optimal gatekeeper payoff (GP), but that is also true of estimating 
other components of the model under rationality assumptions. 
 
188 Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, supra note 10, at 798, n. 148; see also Manuel A. Utset, 
Model of Time-Inconsistent Misconduct: The Case of Lawyer Misconduct, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1319 
(2005). 
 
189 Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, supra note 10, at 798, n. 149. 
 
190 Id. at 798, n. 148. 
 
191 Painter, Convergence and Competition, supra note 11, at 415. 
 
192 Id. at 414. 
 
193 It is foolish to conjecture how a carrot-based merit system would influence collective behavior during a 
market bubble such as that fueled by technological change during the late 1990s and 2000s. See supra text 
accompanying notes 135-137. Given how episodes of financial euphoria recur, it seems doubtful that any 
system design feature can mediate them (yet regulatory change in response to fallouts from financial 
euphoria likewise recurs). See generally Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation?  300 
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B. Private Arrangements  
 
 If the intuition and formal general model are potentially appealing conceptually, it 
remains to consider practical steps necessary to implement it.  The following discussion 
considers private arrangements, for lawyers and auditors, surveying services that an 
incentive program might encompass and sketching some parameters of how private 
contractual arrangements can be designed to fund and execute them. 
 
 1. Services — Rewards concentrate on functions that would be productive for 
gatekeepers to perform, although not otherwise required by law.  This category can be 
large and exists, in part, because of gatekeepers’ reluctance to accept categorical 
exposure to liability for undertaking associated functions. The following illustrates some 
services that the program could encompass.  It classifies them for convenience into two 
categories: investigation and certification.  Examples of each are provided for both 
lawyers and auditors.  
 
a. Investigation 
 
 For lawyers, a good illustration of investigation services concerns due diligence 
exercises.  Law permits, but does not require, lawyers to perform due diligence in 
numerous capital market transactions, from underwritten public offerings to change of 
control arrangements.  Lawyers conduct due diligence because performance creates a 
defense against securities law liability.194  Failure to perform, or failure to discover 
problems and disrupt access to capital markets, does not, ipso facto, expose lawyers to 
liability.195  However, lawyers are component to perform the exercise and sometimes are 
expressly retained to do so, as where an enterprise detects for specific misconduct that 
has come to its board’s attention.196  
 
 For auditors, a good illustration of investigation services concerns fraud detection. 
Auditors conduct full-scale audits of clients but are not strictly obligated to detect for 
                                                                                                                                                 
Years of Evidence, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 849 (1997); Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 77 
(2003). 
 
194 See LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY A. PAREDES, SECURITIES REGULATION, at [5246, n. 151] (3d 
ed. 1998) (noting that the so-called due diligence “duty” is not an affirmative duty but a defense). 
 
195 See Ben D. Orlanski, Whose Representations Are They Anyway? Attorney Prospectus Liability After 
Central Bank, 42 UCLA L. REV. 885, 904–05 (1995) (noting incorrect but common judicial rhetoric 
characterizing the due diligence defense as somehow involving an “affirmative duty”). 
 
196 See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett., 393 N.E.2d 994, 996 & 1003 (N.Y. 1979) (noting how the audit 
committee of General Telephone & Electronics Corp.’s board of directors retained the Washington, D.C. 
law firm of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering to conduct internal investigation growing out of the foreign bribery 
scandals of the 1970s). See generally Arthur F. Mathews, Internal Corporate Investigations, 45 OHIO ST. L. 
J. 655, 666–678 (1984) (providing numerous illustrations of the practice and its origins as well as assessing 
benefits and costs).  
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fraud.197  Failure to discover fraud does not, in itself, expose auditors to legal liability.  
Professional auditing standards articulate a modest measure of obligation to detect for 
fraud, but its exact scope as a matter of law is contested and uncertain.198  As a result, its 
execution in practice is limited.199  Auditors prefer to deny having any duties that would 
flow from a broad interpretation of the standard.200  Nevertheless, auditors sometimes 
assume express contractual duties to investigate for fraud, such as when they are engaged 
to conduct forensic audits.201 Auditors actively promote the value of this service.202 As 
with lawyers who undertake contractual duties to conduct due diligence, this signals that 
auditors command the professional skills and ingenuity required to perform this service. 
 
b. Certification 
 
 Written legal opinions are examples of certification services that lawyers provide.  
Lawyers often provide these to clients for various securities-related matters, and 
sometimes prepare them for others at a client’s request.203  A common context occurs 
when an underwriting agreement conditions the underwriter’s duty on receiving an 
                                                 
197 See Gideon Mark, Accounting Fraud: Pleading Scienter of Auditors Under the PSLRA, 39 CONN. L. 
REV. 1097, 1147–50, 1155 (2007) (elaborating upon ways that professional auditing standards prevent 
imposition of legal liability for non-detection of fraud). 
 
198 Reflecting both the stakes and the controversy, accounting standard-setters have rewritten the applicable 
auditing standards on numerous occasions. See AM. INST. CERT. PUB. ACCT., STATEMENT OF AUDITING 
STANDARD NO. 99, CONSIDERATION OF FRAUD IN A FINANCIAL STATEMENT AUDIT (2002) (version 
currently in effect). The current standard mainly elaborates on the difficulties auditors face in detecting 
fraud rather than specifying anything resembling a duty to investigate or pro-actively to detect for it. For 
analysis of predecessor formulations, see Mark F. Zimbelman, The Effects of SAS No. 82 on Auditors’ 
Attention to Fraud Risk Factors and Audit Planning Decisions, 35 J. ACCT. RES. 75, at [pin cite] (1997). 
 
199 See Sean M. O’Connor, Strengthening Auditor Independence: Reestablishing Audits as Control and 
Premium Signaling Mechanisms, 81 WASH. L. REV. 525, 582–583 (2006) (in support of prescription to 
replace the US mandatory statutory audit with a shareholder-driven audit, arguing that the “general purpose 
audit” is “not a very effective device” particularly compared to a forensic audit). 
 
200 See COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 9, at 138–46 (“The battle lines seem to have been drawn: the 
profession is content with an emphasis on internal controls, while reformers want enhanced standards 
requiring the auditor to recognize a responsibility to detect material fraud. For the profession, this latter 
priority carries the prospect of greater litigation exposure.”). 
 
201 See Vinita Ramaswamy, Corporate Governance and the Forensic Accountant, CPA J. (March 2005), 
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2005/305/essentials/p68.htm. 
 
202 See Samuel A. DiPiazza et al., Global Capital Markets And The Global Economy: A Vision From The 
CEOs Of The International Audit Networks 10 (2006), 
http://www.globalpublicpolicysymposium.com/CEO_Vision.pdf (noting report of large audit firms 
advocating mandatory forensic audits or all public companies on random or periodic basis). 
 
203 See Jonathan M. Barnett, Degenerate Certification: The Opinion Puzzle and Other Transactional 
Curiosities, ___ J. CORP. L. ___ (forthcoming Nov. 2007); SCOTT T. FITZGIBBON & DONALD W. GLAZER, 
FITZGIBBON AND GLAZER ON LEGAL OPINIONS: WHAT OPINIONS IN FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS SAY AND 
WHAT THEY MEAN [pin cite] (1992). 
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opinion from issuer’s counsel concerning the legality of the transaction and compliance, 
as to form, with federal securities regulations. 
 
 Lawyers’ opinions tend to be narrowly drawn and addressed. They invariably 
provide “negative assurance.”204 The opinion states that the firm conducted investigations 
it deemed necessary and that nothing came to its attention that would prevent it from 
opining that the transaction is lawful and disclosure in conformity with regulations.205  
Reliance is expressly limited to addressees, usually a client’s board of directors (or, 
sometimes, an underwriting firm of a client’s securities). Apart from contractual 
requirements and modest risk of liability such as negligent misrepresentation, failure to 
provide an opinion does not expose a firm to legal liability or even reputational 
damage.206  
  
 Written comfort letters are examples of certification services that auditors 
provide. In securities underwriting, an underwriter’s obligations are conditioned on 
receipt of a designated comfort letter from the issuer’s auditors.  As with lawyers’ 
opinions, these provide negative assurance and do not require the auditor to conduct any 
particular investigation.207  In present practice, evidence suggests that auditors expressly 
disclaim any specific responsibility for detecting fraud, echoing the profession’s more 
general aversion to accepting such duties.208 
 
c. Why Law Does Not Mandate these Services 
 
 Law could require that gatekeepers render investigation and certification services 
of the kind just described.  It could mandate that lawyers perform due diligence in 
securities transactions and provide formal written certifications to designated transaction 
participants, including investors.209 It could require that those certifications state 
                                                 
204 See Special Report of the Task Force on Securities Law Opinions, Negative Assurance in Securities 
Offerings (Joint Effect of the ABA Committee on Legal Opinions and Subcommittee on Securities Law 
Opinions of the ABA Federal Regulation of Securities Law Committee), 59 BUS. LAW. 1513 passum 
(2004). 
 
205 Id. 
 
206 For a primer on the subject of lawyers’ legal opinions (i.e., addressing contexts beyond that of capital 
market gatekeeping), see Jeffrey Smith, A Legal Opinion Malpractice Primer (The Legal Opinion 
Committee Workshop), PLI Order No. 6232 (March 2005). 
 
207 Auditing regulations govern the preparation, scope and delivery of comfort letters. See AM. INST. CERT. 
PUB. ACCT., STATEMENT OF AUDITING STANDARDS NO. 72 (SAS 72); AU § 634, Letters for Underwriters 
and Certain Other Requesting Parties (adopted as an Interim Standard by PCAOB); see also William J. 
Whelan, III, Accountant’s Due Diligence and Comfort Letters, PLI Order No. 10,852 (April 2007) 
(providing practice perspective on auditors’ comfort letters). 
 
208 COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 9, at 166 & 168 (discussing how the auditing profession is “refusing 
to discuss the prospect for fraud or illegality with other gatekeepers.”). 
 
209 Coffee, The Attorney as Gatekeeper, supra note 35, at 1311 & 1313–15, n. 57. 
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affirmatively that disclosure is fair and accurate in all material respects.  Law could 
clarify that auditors are responsible for detecting fraud and require that they provide 
specific positive assurance to underwriters or other transaction participants.  But law has 
not done so and probably for good reasons.  
 
 First, such blanket mandates may demand more than is necessary. Not all 
enterprises require comprehensive gatekeeper vetting.210  Second, that might demand 
more than is possible. Fraud and other sources of mis-reporting can be hidden in ways 
that no professional could discover.211  Risks of error can be so high that the expected 
costs to the professionals exceed the price that they could charge for backstopping their 
opinions. As a result, the professions resist accepting such duties as a political matter.212 
This implies, however, that the threat of legal liability can backfire.  Auditors and 
lawyers have a comparative advantage to investigate and certify yet, under the existing 
regime, these services may be rendered on sub-optimal terms.213 Designing a system in 
which auditors and lawyers would agree to perform these functions—without fear of 
legal liability—is thus appealing.  
 
 2. Contracts.  Contracts are useful devices to induce gatekeepers to render 
investigation and certification services.  The following discussion presents some 
requirements to promote contract effectiveness, evaluates possible contractual 
arrangements and incentives and notes the risk of creating excess incentives.  
 
a.  Requirements 
 
Effective contracting to make a positive incentives program useful probably 
requires at least the following attributes.   First, the program’s strength depends on 
generating and channeling sufficient funds to gatekeepers.214 Compensation must be 
sufficient to fund an optimal level of gatekeeper payoffs (GP). The challenge is finding 
the funding. Ideally, funds would draw on resources that already exist in the capital 
                                                 
210 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Independent Directors and the ALI Corporate Governance Project, 61 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1034, 1065 (1993). 
 
211 See, e.g., Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate 
Fraud?, NBER Working Paper No. 12,882 (Feb. 2007) (empirical study of fraud detection covering 1994 
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212 COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 9, at 166, 168. 
 
213 The greater the professional resistance to a broad mandate, the more likely it is suited to an incentives 
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formation process.  One possibility, discussed below, is contractual reallocation of deal 
cash flows, chiefly from issuers and underwriters to auditors and lawyers.  
 
 Second,  the program should satisfy the requirements of a signaling equilibrium.  
The strength depends, in part, on dissemination of information about it to capital market 
participants.215  The contracts provide signals to market participants; enterprises giving 
gatekeepers incentives to disrupt mis-reporting should benefit from lower costs of capital 
compared to those unwilling to do so.216  Signals work when the cost of signaling varies 
inversely with actual quality (i.e., it costs more for lower quality actors to signal; if it 
were cheaper to do so, everyone would signal and the value would plummet).217  An 
incentives program would satisfy this condition because it would impose costs on low 
quality signalers that they would be unwilling to pay. 
 
 Third,  all incentive-based exercises that gatekeepers undertake would be 
optional.  Services that gatekeepers are otherwise legally required to perform are outside 
its scope.  This triggers a related final requirement that judicial interpretation of resulting 
agreements should be strict.  A law or auditing firm that expressly agrees to examine an 
enterprise to uncover mis-reporting but fails to do so should not face liability if the 
express terms of the contract do not carry any guarantee of performance.  Litigation risk 
must not be so high that the expected liability costs of undertaking the optional functions 
exceeds the fair market contract price for undertaking them.  
 
b. Modifying Present Practice  
 
 Modest modification to present practice would enable implementing positive 
gatekeeper incentives meeting the foregoing requirements.  The following is intended to 
illustrate one context in which this could work—without meaning to be exhaustive.218 
                                                 
215 Confidential incentive contracts could result in more effective gatekeeping (through discovery and 
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216 Cf. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron, supra note 11, at 410 (noting 
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Take the examples given in Section III.B.1 concerning lawyers’ opinion letters and 
auditors’ comfort letters.  Both are products of underwriting agreements and reflect that 
those professionals conducted investigations they deemed necessary and nothing came to 
their attention to prevent providing the certification.  The professionals earn their fee as a 
result, in accordance with their retention or engagement agreements with issuers.  
 
 Under positive incentive contracts, in contrast, the professionals would agree with 
issuers to undertake the investigative functions and earn compensation to the extent, and 
only to the extent, that the investigation results in discoveries of mis-reporting. The 
important negotiated provisions would address compensation, delineate the activities or 
discoveries that generate it, and verification measures. In the best scenarios, those 
discoveries would result in correction and still enable the issuer to access capital markets; 
but the gatekeepers would also be paid in cases where their discoveries led to denying 
that access. All participants in the transaction—underwriters, issuers, auditors and 
lawyers—have incentives to enter in these arrangements.   
 
 For underwriters, several incentives to modify existing arrangements in favor of 
this kind of program. First, the program need not replace the existing conditions set forth 
in underwriting agreements that generate negative assurance.  Second, underwriters are 
gatekeepers too and face reputation and liability constraints elaborated in the traditional 
gatekeeping model. They can protect reputation and reduce liability risk by increasing the 
effectiveness of their fellow gatekeepers. Current evidence indicates that underwriters are 
seeking to have auditors perform such functions but auditors are unwilling to do so.219 An 
incentives program can break the resulting stalemate. Accordingly, it should be desirable, 
in principle, for underwriters to agree with issuers to create optional opportunities for 
their fellow gatekeepers to actively seek to discover and correct mis-reporting. 
 
 Most issuers should find this strategy attractive. True, enterprises that are 
institutionally dedicated to mis-reporting would find the proposal repellant. But the 
resulting differentiation among issuers creates the required signaling equilibrium to 
increase the program’s strength. For investors, this would separate enterprises according 
to the relative probability that their reporting is fair compared to misleading.220  
 
 Furthermore, while difficult to verify empirically, it does not seem common for 
entire enterprises to be institutionally dedicated to mis-reporting; more commonly, 
individual agents within an enterprise wish to mis-report. In either case, the reforms made 
in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act create internal governance structures associated with boards of 
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directors that can be useful.221 Willingness to adapt arrangements to implement one likely 
would have to originate with an issuer’s board of directors, although it is not impossible 
to believe that senior executives would find it attractive, so long as they are not among an 
inner circle committed to deception.222  
 
 Within issuers, audit committees should support gatekeeper incentives and be able 
to develop them.  Many believe that the most important of the changes in the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act is audit committee power over auditors.223  The law  reposes in audit 
committees the power to select, compensate, supervise and terminate auditors, as well 
more power over the selection of appropriate accounting principles through a formal role 
in resolving disagreements between management and auditors and expressly empowering 
audit committees to retain independent counsel and other advisors.224   Audit committees 
now wield considerable influence in the audit function and easily could develop incentive 
contracts and other programs to promote effective gatekeeping, by both auditors and 
lawyers.   
 
 For audit committees who believe that the rewards approach is conceptually 
appealing in principle, this aspiration can be stated expressly as part of the audit 
committee’s charter.  To the extent that the issuer assumes responsibility to fund bonus 
compensation that lawyers or auditors earn in the exercise, they should be able to 
command requisite resources internally from the enterprise under the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act’s provisions requiring that issuers give audit committees a sufficient budget.225 
Committees can argue, credibly, that associated costs will be vastly outweighed by saving 
the costs of later-discovered mis-reporting.  
 
 The issuer would not have to fund 100% of the awards.  Award funding would be 
subject to negotiation between the issuer and underwriter. The issuer could agree to pay 
all bonus compensation or the issuer and underwriter could agree to share designated 
portions.  Funding a portion of the payout will be appealing to the underwriter according 
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to its calculations, under the traditional gatekeeping model, of reputation and liability 
costs that result from later-discovered mis-reporting.  
 
 Triggers for the awards would likewise be subject to negotiation.  They would 
specify threshold levels necessary to earn compensation and specify kinds of error or 
irregularity that are included and excluded.  Parameters would reflect the difference 
between activities that a gatekeeper is otherwise obligated to perform under existing law 
and those that it is voluntarily undertaking to perform contractually.   In delineating these 
boundaries in the underwriting agreement, all participants would contribute to 
negotiations—issuers and underwriters as well as auditors and lawyers.  
 
 Resulting incentives should make this approach enticing to auditors and lawyers. 
Auditing and law firms could increase its appeal and effectiveness by designing internal 
compensation systems through which the contingency payments for discovery are 
channeled to appropriate personnel.  Among other contributions, this would facilitate the 
prescription, noted earlier, to create mechanisms that support channeling negative 
information through a chain of reporting.226 
 
 The philosophical aspects of a positive incentives program could be reflected 
within such firms in compensation systems.  At present, audit firm partner compensation 
is tied to generating revenues from consulting or auditing work and, since the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act was passed, on designing and testing systems of internal control.  The Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) encourages firms to allocate resources 
and compensation to functions designed to improve auditors’ technical competence.227 
Without diminishing the importance of these ways of allocating resources, sufficient 
flexibility appears that would enable compensation systems to channel gains from 
effective gatekeeping to responsible partners.  The same should be true of law firms. 
 
c. Risk of Excess Incentives 
 
 Contracts designed to create incentives for effective gatekeeping require attention 
to the (ironic) risk that gatekeepers will fabricate mis-reporting to obtain additional 
compensation. As a theoretical matter, this risk also exists in the current reputation-and-
liability model of gatekeeping. Auditor reputations increase in value by repeated 
demonstrations of integrity, whether this is achieved by detecting and correcting mis-
reporting or more public statements such as resigning from an engagement. That can 
create a strategic temptation to be too strict on clients.   
 
 Similar strategic mis-fires could arise under incentive programs. To police for 
such temptations in this context, contracts would specify not only the kinds of discoveries 
that generate compensation, but also provide for a verification procedure.  For payments 
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by issuers to gatekeepers, audit committees can perform this function; in the case of 
gatekeeper firm payments to internal personnel, verification committees could be 
established. In general, however, it should be easier to detect fraud about fraud than 
fraud itself.  
 
 3. Teams — To expand the specific illustrations just given of how contracts can 
be designed to create positive incentives, consider a broader framework involving the use 
of teams in the gatekeeping setting.  Traditionally, enterprises retain one law firm and 
engage one auditing firm in securities transactions and often, especially for law firms, 
they dispatch a single team of experts who work together on the matter. Commonly, 
another enterprise participating in the transaction likewise hires and dispatches lawyers 
and auditors (as with counterparties in a business combination or financing arrangement).  
 
 These traditional approaches could be adjusted.  For example, as Professor Coffee 
has explored heuristically, an enterprise could engage two separate teams of lawyers for a 
matter or retain a single law firm, but have it dispatch two separate teams.228 This 
construct reflects the dual role that lawyers play in such contexts, serving as both 
advocates and advisors to the enterprise on the one hand and a public gatekeeping 
function on the other. Tensions result.  Using two firms or teams can enable segregating 
these functions so that each can discharge professional responsibilities without ethical 
dissonance. While so deploying two teams can be expensive and redundant, the notion 
should not be dismissed. 
 
 First, auditors functionally deploy the equivalent of two teams to work on a single 
engagement.  Audit firms dispatch engagement teams to work on particular audits, but 
these must report to and interact with partners and other teams in the firms’ national 
offices. The national office is functionally equivalent to an incentives-driven supervisory 
team. Using incentives, either team would be more willing to deploy more rigorous 
auditing techniques, as where teams may elect to perform the more rigorous testing 
required in forensic audits than in traditional financial statement auditing.  
 
 This auditing practice of using an engagement team subject to national office 
supervision has a parallel in the organization of some large corporate law firms. They 
maintain internal policies that subject individual retentions to internal review.  Examples 
include having a committee of partners review new clients and obtaining second- or 
third- partner review of firm opinions on certain matters before issuing them.  The New 
York law firm of White & Case famously implemented these structures in its agreement 
settling charges arising from its role in the notorious National Student Marketing fraud of 
the 1970s.229 
 
 Second, among lawyers, there invariably are two teams on cooperative 
transactions—usually from different law firms. In securities offerings, both underwriter’s 
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and issuer’s counsel participate in due diligence exercises designed to enable preparing 
fair disclosure in the prospectus.  In business combinations, each side, buyer and seller, 
retains lawyers to negotiate the governing agreements, along with voluminous disclosure 
schedules, on the basis of respective due diligence investigations.  Likewise, both sides’ 
lawyers often prepare opinions in those transactions.  While both sides seek to protect 
their own client’s position, they are most effective when generating maximum gains from 
the transaction—creating value, not just claiming it.230  
 
 In transactions with two teams, it should be possible to design assignment and 
compensation contracts that, while facilitating meeting professional responsibilities, also 
enable promoting lawyers’ role as gatekeepers. The ideal would be contracts in which 
one team is designated as the closing team whose mission is to accomplish the transaction 
and the other is the gatekeeping team whose assignment is to perform due diligence and 
certification functions. The closing team can be compensated conventionally, as based on 
billable hours, while the gatekeeping team can be compensated according to a base rate 
plus contingent bonuses in respect of discovered mis-reporting (whether or not 
corrected). Addressing the specific professional responsibilities may be difficult, but the 
example suggests the vitality of Professor Coffee’s heuristic. 
 
 Third, enlisting and designating two separate legal or audit teams for a transaction 
copes with increased complicity risks when individuals and teams within a gatekeeper or 
among different gatekeepers are capable of conspiring. This is an important insight 
accompanying Professor McGowan’s proposal to offer immunity to lawyers who disrupt 
mis-reporting: creating incentives to do so weakens the capacity to conspire.231   Effective 
deal-making requires that participants cooperate to a large extent; this capacity must be 
preserved.  A good way to do so is to dispatch two teams with designated assignments, 
each of which would be cooperative to the end of (a) closing a transaction while (b) using 
fair reporting.  Each would have incentives that contribute to promoting that twin result. 
 
  The dual-team approach reflects the insights from Mr. Buffett’s and Professor 
Painter’s bilateral professional service retention models.232 Two teams facing different 
incentives will be inclined to exert pressure against each other. Mis-reporting temptations 
by the closing team are offset by opposite incentives of the gatekeeping team; 
temptations to overzealousness among the gatekeeping team are constrained by contrary 
incentives of the closing team.233  
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C. Public Recognition  
 
 Apart from cash compensation channeled by contract to effective gatekeepers and 
team design, a broader range of public recognition could form part of a carrot system to 
supplement the traditional gatekeeping model. A proposal to provide public recognition 
raises and requires addressing several additional issues.  These are cultural challenges to 
implementing the system, the relation of compensation to professional morality and the 
potential that public recognition could create excessive incentives among gatekeepers to 
exercise gatekeeping prerogatives.  
 
 1.  Culture — Effective gatekeeping relies not only on the conditions of reputation 
and liability threats but on broader cultural foundations that make those stimuli 
function.234 In contemporary culture, media, regulators and scholars concentrate on 
persons who failed to perform their functions. These persons or firms are “shamed” in the 
press, face liability at the hands of authorities, and are given analytical attention by 
scholars inquiring into diagnostics that can yield normative policy implications.235 Much 
rarer are media, regulatory or scholarly attention on those gatekeepers who perform their 
functions successfully. For this reason alone, a merit system should have some appeal to 
highlight the degree to which gatekeeping is effective. 
 
 In contrast, such public recognition is showered on “heroes” who, after the fact, 
exercise authority to prosecute the villains. Consider Elliot Spitzer. As Attorney General 
of the State of New York, he earned public “hero” status for his enforcement of laws in a 
wide range of contexts in the post-bubble fallout.236  That status, in turn, played a 
significant role in his subsequent election as Governor of that State. True, private 
whistleblowers such as Sharron Watkins of Enron shared in some of the limelight, but 
even then received mixed reviews, in part for emerging long after the scandal had 
incubated.237  Hero status is not conferred on gatekeepers or others who disrupt mis-
reporting and correct it because their effectiveness is not normally publicly disclosed. 
 
                                                 
234 Cf. Macey, A Pox, supra note 11, at 331 (noting that factors other than corporate governance and 
securities laws bear on the honesty of actors within those systems, including “religiously, culturally, and 
sociologically induced incentive structures”); Frankel, supra note 1, at 165–73 (elaborating on concept of 
corporate culture and challenges involved in influencing it over time). 
 
235 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1255 (1999); 
Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L REV. 1009, 
1011 (1997); David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1912-13 (2001). 
 
236 Jonathan R. Macey, Wall Street in Turmoil: State-Federal Relations Post-Eliot Spitzer, 70 BROOK. L. 
REV. 117, 120–22 (2004) (noting that Time magazine named Spitzer the “crusader of the year” and offering 
an interpretation for federalism of his stated-based enforcement campaign); Kulbir Walha & Edward E. 
Filusch, Eliot Spitzer: A Crusader Against Corporate Malfeasance or a Politically Ambitious Spotlight 
Hound?, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1111, 1112-15 (2005). 
 
237 E.g., Robert Salladay, “Snitch” Bill Passed by State Senate, S.F. CHRON. (June 21, 2002) (“Enron Vice 
President Sharon Watkins, hailed as a whistle-blower hero, had never informed the public or government 
about alleged wrongdoing but simply wrote a skeptical memo to the company chairman”). 
 
 47
 Consider a more proactive strategy of public recognition.  Unlike with 
gatekeeping contracts or team structure components of incentive programs, public 
recognition does not necessarily require cash (or at least not large amounts).238 A good 
model of public recognition are the Malcom Baldridge National Quality Awards, named 
for a US Commerce Secretary and awarded annually since 1988 to US innovators who 
demonstrate exemplary leadership in designated performance categories.239 For capital 
market gatekeeping, the SEC or PCAOB could adapt this honor to recognize an Auditor 
of the Year or Lawyer of the Year for successful disruption of mis-reporting. It is more 
socially valuable to make heroes out of auditors and securities lawyers ex ante than of 
prosecutors (or plaintiffs’ lawyers) ex post. 
 
 The parameters of systematic formal public recognition must be drawn carefully. 
This is necessary to appreciate a more general potential obstacle to paying rewards to 
effective gatekeepers: a traditional cultural aversion to ratting in the United States.240 
This aversion arises from how competing values such as loyalty and trust are 
implicated.241  These can be in tension with whistle-blowing or gatekeeping, which are 
forms of ratting. The strength or frequency of the aversion is essentially impossible to 
estimate and can certainly be overstated. Yet the existence of governmental bounty 
programs (such as those of the IRS and SEC) and of qui tem actions suggest that 
inducements are necessary to entice US persons to rat on fellow citizens.242 
 
 On the other hand, for capital market gatekeepers, these tensions should be more 
attenuated than for other citizens. The professional status of most gatekeepers embraces 
probity and integrity more compatible with disrupting mis-reporting than with loyalty in 
acquiescing to it. This tendency is probably strongest for auditors, whose training and 
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self-identification entails professional skepticism that is a cognate of ratting.243  The 
common designation of the profession as a public watchdog bears this out.  
 
 In contrast, lawyers face conflicting values.  Enlisting lawyers as capital market 
watchdogs confronts the profession’s traditional advocacy model and resulting principles 
of confidentiality epitomized in the attorney-client privilege.244 Lawyers have not 
historically assumed a watchdog identity comparable to that of auditors.  Despite that 
history, some sense of a watchdog function has animated at least part of the professional 
identity of the securities lawyer—as it has for other private lawyers who play a quais-
public role.245  For securities lawyers willing to accept this somewhat complex identify, a 
carrot system can ease resulting tensions.  
 
 Either way, however, public recognition for such activities must be carefully 
drawn to be in tune with the public’s general aversion to ratting. The “heroes” must be 
portrayed in much the way that Elliott Spitzer was presented. They must be seen as 
dedicated, public-minded professionals, perhaps seeking to advance their own careers—
as Spitzer certainly did—but only in a way that is consistent with the public interest—
likewise, as Spitzer did.246 
 
 2. Functions — The prevailing lack of public recognition for successful 
gatekeeping may also be due to the historical emphasis on gatekeeping functions as 
opposed to whistleblower functions. That is, gatekeeper models are designed to act 
internally within an enterprise rather than shine the public spotlight on it.  But public 
recognition for successful gatekeeping obviously would alter that.  
 
 A good example occurred in the 1970s when the auditing firm of Arthur Young 
blew the whistle on, and withheld support from, Lockheed Corporation amid the foreign 
government bribery scandals of that era.247  Lockheed and its top managers had much to 
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gain from concealing the scheme—it was criminal.  But Arthur Young disrupted their 
ability to do so by disrupting Lockheed’s access to capital markets. As theory would 
predict and explain, in Professor Kraakman’s terms, Arthur Young had little to gain and 
much to lose from complicity.248 And Arthur Young received considerable public 
recognition for its refusal in the contemporary press.249 
 
 In contrast, today’s sensibilities shower less praise on effective gatekeepers and 
instead tend to diagnose pathological cases for lessons about what went wrong and then 
generalize from these for systemic reform.250  With that orientation, it is unsurprising that 
policymakers and scholars incline toward refashioning the duties and liability strategies 
in search of optimal deterrence.  An alternative, less common, approach would examine 
how and why things go well. Reputation and liability risks may influence a professional’s 
decision-making, but more fundamental norms drive professional behavior too.251  Many 
professionals who perform effectively do so to obtain satisfaction from a job well done—
not for fear of liability or damaging reputation. What should the consequences be of 
doing a good job?  
 
 For many critics, it appears that doing a required job is simply the norm and doing 
it well deserves no special praise.  But if one condemns those who fail in their job, why 
not be willing to recognize those who perform their jobs well? A more general and 
affirming response to good work is recognition. This can assume many forms, from a 
simple expression of gratitude (like a supervisor’s pat on the back or handwritten note)252 
to a more forthright public expression of appreciation. A carrot system could envision 
that kind of public recognition for disrupting mis-reporting (in addition to the form of 
cash incentive programs discussed in the preceding section).  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
auditors of Lockheed, “put their responsible corporate self forward by refusing to certify the Lockheed 
Annual Report” prompting managers to respond, deliberate and reform and, amid the resulting “domino-
effect of public-regarding deliberation, Lockheed became ‘a born again corporation’”) (attributing this 
latter phrase to DAVID BOULTON, THE GREASE MACHINE 276 (1978) and noting that additional details 
appear in BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, THE IMPACT OF PUBLICITY ON CORPORATE OFFENDERS 144 
(1983)). 
 
248 See supra text accompanying note 171. 
 
249 E.g., Lockheed’s Bribes Backfire, BUS. WK. (Feb. 23, 1976); William A. Shumann, Lockheed Agrees to 
End Payouts Abroad, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH. (Sept. 1, 1975); Robert M. Smith, Information Bank 
Abstracts, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 1976; Feb. 8, 1976; Sept. 1, 1975). 
 
250 See Gregory Mitchell, Case Studies, Counterfactuals and Causal Explanations, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 
1517, 1521-25 (2004) (challenging tendency of legal scholars diagnosing Enron failure to narrate causal 
stories from selected facts and then draw normative implications from them).  
 
251 See JEFFREY PFEFFER, THE HUMAN EQUATION: BUILDING PROFITS BY PUTTING PEOPLE FIRST [pin cite] 
(1998). 
  
252 See Paul Strebel, Why Do Employees Resist Change?, 74 HARV. BUS. REV. 86, [pin cite] (1996). 
 
 50
 This may raise an objection. It may appear that paying gatekeepers extra for doing 
what they ought to do—whether required by law or by professional or other non-legal 
commands.253 As to legal requirements, the proposal preempts this objection to avoid 
problems of contract law’s pre-existing duty rule.254 The proposal envisions a program 
that pays compensation or recognition for performing functions not otherwise legally 
required. As to professional or other non-legal commands, the objection is harder to meet, 
for it is valiant to emphasize such commands and project ethical appeals to induce 
superior gatekeeping. Yet it seems more realistic to appreciate how cash and public 
recognition can contribute to achieving those aspirations.  
 
 Perhaps paradoxically, cash and recognition may even be edifying vehicles to 
reinforce professional principles. Consider how structural forces catalogued earlier may 
have reduced gatekeeper incentives to invest in reputational capital.255 Among audit 
firms, the phenomenon of cross-selling (bundling consulting assignments to auditing 
engagements) changed auditing culture from professionalism to commercialism. Since 
reversing culture is difficult,256 tools that work within existing culture are more promising 
than those alien to it. A carrot system works within existing commercial culture by 
paying people bonuses when successful as detectives. That should induce investment in 
reputation despite contrary forces and that, in turn, would promote an ethical sense of 
probity and integrity among those so compensated.  
 
 3. Effects —  In the years after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act passed, critics complained 
of what they saw as a decline in US competitiveness in global capital markets. They cited 
a decrease in the frequency and size of initial public offerings in New York compared to 
London and a decline in the number of public companies listed in the US.257  Implicitly, 
these critics essentially argue that gatekeeping can be too effective. A carrot system, in 
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this view, is the last thing these markets need. This critique invites brief remarks on the 
parallel but different system of gatekeeping that appears in the legislative process.258 
 
 Certain theories of the legislative process emphasize the presence of multiple 
“vetogates.”  These refer to choke points in the legislative process that enable participants 
to obstruct the passage of legislation.259  Examples include Congressional bicameralism, 
Presidential presentment, supermajority voting (as with overriding a Presidential veto), 
formal standing rules, Senatorial rules concerning filibusters and cloture, the committee 
and conference reporting systems and even informal legislative mores.260 Numerous 
gatekeepers participate in activating these vetogates, including the President, as well as 
committee chairs, senior Senators and House members and, especially, lobbyists.261  The 
result is that the vast majority of bills do not become law, a deliberate strategy designed 
to minimize the risk of sub-optimal lawmaking as well as to promote confidence that law 
is supported by consensus.262 
 
 Compared to the legislative process, the capital formation process is modestly 
parallel yet radically different. The parallel concerns how system design contains 
numerous vetogates.  Consider the many opportunities to activate vetogates in a typical 
securities transactions, say a public offering: hiring an underwriter to sell it; attracting 
securities analysts to follow it; retaining lawyers to negotiate and document the terms and 
furnish legal opinions; engaging auditors to audit financial statements (and internal 
controls) and offer related comfort letters; for debt, getting a rating agency to rate it; 
requesting that the SEC declare the related registration statement effective; and closing 
the transaction. Without being scientific about it, there appear to be as many vetogates in 
capital market transactions as there are in the legislative process.  
 
 The radical differences between vetogates in legislative processes compared to 
capital market transactions concern the purpose of these devices and the orientation of 
participants.  Vetogates in legislative processes are intended to reduce the probability of 
passing legislation and this is seen as necessary to promote the appearance and 
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achievement of consensus and the effectiveness of laws.263  For securities transactions, 
the cultural milieu is nearly exactly the opposite.  Participants want to facilitate the deal, 
to enable the financing, to form or transfer capital.  
 
 Some vocal critics of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act imply that more capital market 
transactions are better and more public companies are better—they criticize the Act’s 
fallout by showing proportionately fewer public offerings made in New York compared 
to London and a falling number of public companies in the US.264  But becoming and 
staying a public company historically were—and probably should be—badges of honor. 
To sustain that designation, it should not necessarily be easier to become or continue as a 
public company than it is for a bill to become law.  
 
 It is unlikely, that vetogating in capital markets would or should ever be more 
common than vetogating in legislative processes. Capital market vetogates are not 
discretionary in the same way they can be in the legislative process.  Rather, the system 
installs additional cross-checks designed to counterbalance competing incentives.  
Managers who are inclined to mis-report when doing so earns lucrative gains from stock 
options currently face gatekeepers whose compensation is not tied to reporting accuracy, 
except through vague reputation constraints and liability risks. Tying gatekeeper 
compensation to disrupting mis-reporting would neutralize contrary incentives. The 
potential risk the system raises of excessive vetogating is further reduced by the 
continuing presence of participants with strong incentives to get deals or audits done.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Regulatory reform and scholarly literature concerning capital market gatekeepers 
have historically concentrated on penalties for failing to meet legal duties or structures to 
promote investment in reputations.  Imposing penalties to deter acquiescence is a natural 
response, in part because acquiescent gatekeepers assume a vivid public posture amid 
publicized fraud, and part because lawyers and law naturally look to liability design to 
influence behavior. Penalties may be necessary to achieve optimal deterrence. Promoting 
investment in reputations for integrity likewise produces a valuable contribution to 
capital market integrity.  
 
 A new line of inquiry is developing that focuses on rewarding gatekeepers. This 
innovation should have considerable purchase when one considers how the reputational 
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constraint and liability threats were insufficient to deter widespread ineffective 
gatekeeping during the late 1990s and early 2000s.  We have learned in recent decades 
that positive incentives may be more likely than negative threats to promote desired 
behavior.  That insight can and should be adapted to promote effective capital market 
gatekeeping.  The examples provided in this Article of how to redesign contractual cash 
flows and deploy professional teams, as well as increase public recognition for 
gatekeeping success, are intended to advance that discussion. 
 
 
